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The French Revolution of 1789 had a momentous impact on neighboring countries. The French Revolutionary
armies during the 1790s and later under Napoleon invaded and controlled large parts of Europe. Together
with invasion came various radical institutional changes. French invasion removed the legal and economic
barriers that had protected the nobility, clergy, guilds, and urban oligarchies and established the principle
of equality before the law. The evidence suggests that areas that were occupied by the French and
that underwent radical institutional reform experienced more rapid urbanization and economic growth,
especially after 1850. There is no evidence of a negative effect of French invasion. Our interpretation
is that the Revolution destroyed (the institutional underpinnings of) the power of oligarchies and elites
opposed to economic change; combined with the arrival of new economic and industrial opportunities
in the second half of the 19th century, this helped pave the way for future economic growth. The evidence
does not provide any support for several other views, most notably, that evolved institutions are inherently
superior to those 'designed'; that institutions must be 'appropriate' and cannot be 'transplanted'; and
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The recent literature on comparative development has emphasized that underdevelopment is
caused by institutions that do not create the right incentives for economic growth. But there
is disagreement about which specic institutions are important. Some scholars emphasize
property rights (North and Thomas, 1973, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, Acemoglu
and Johnson, 2005), some legal institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1998) and others barriers to entry or oligarchies (Olson, 1982, Acemoglu, 2008).
Another unresolved issue is whether institutions can be designed, and relatedly whether
they can be reformed externally. Hayek (1960) argued that institutions cannot be designed
and have to evolve organically (and that this was the major reason for the inferiority of the
civil code), and a recent literature has claimed that institutions have to be `appropriate' to the
specic circumstances of countries (Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, 2003a,b, Rodrik, 2007).1
These problems are amplied when such reforms are implemented `Big Bang' style. Propo-
nents of these views argue that enforced institutional change is likely to reduce prosperity, a
claim that receives some support from the apparent failures of institutional reforms in Latin
America, Africa, the former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, and the recent experiences in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Not all external reform are failures, however, as evidenced, for example,
by the successful US-imposed reforms in postwar Germany and Japan.
In this paper we exploit the variation in institutional reform created in Europe by the French
Revolution to investigate the consequences of radical, externally-imposed reform on subsequent
economic growth. After 1792 French armies invaded and reformed the institutions of many
European countries. The lessons from this episode are central to some of the current debates on
institutions. First, the package of reforms the French imposed on areas they conquered included
the civil code, the abolition of guilds and the remnants of feudalism, and the introduction of
equality before the law and the undermining of aristocratic privilege. These reforms thus clearly
relate to the above-mentioned debates. If oligarchies were the main barrier to economic growth
in Europe at the turn of the 19th century, then we would expect the Revolutionary reforms
to unleash more rapid economic growth in aected areas. If, on the other hand, externally-
imposed radical reform is generally costly or if the civil code creates major distortions, the
1Relatedly, a dominant paradigm in economics maintains that institutions eciently|albeit slowly|adapt
to the underlying characteristics of society (e.g., Demsetz, 1967, Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer, 2003).
1reforms should have negative eects.2
We investigate the economic consequences of the French Revolution, and particularly, the
reforms that it imposed on the rest of Europe, by using two sources of historical data. The rst
is cross-national. French armies invaded and reformed some parts of Europe but not others,
so we can take those invaded as the `treatment group' and compare their relative economic
success before and after the revolutionary period. Nevertheless, there is a substantial amount
of heterogeneity in this sample. For instance, the French tended to have a greater impact on
countries in Western Europe compared to Eastern Europe and even though we show that there
is no evidence of pre-trends, this does not rule out potential unobserved dierences between
the treatment and control groups.
In addition to cross-national variation, we also examine variation within Germany. Parts
of Germany, primarily the west and northwest, were invaded and reformed, while the south
and the east were not. Therefore we can construct more comparable treatment and control
groups within Germany. In addition, we collected data to develop several series of institutional
reforms across German polities. This enables us both to verify that the French did indeed
reform various aspects of institutions and to utilize a two-stage least squares strategy, with
French invasion as an instrument for institutional reform.
Crucially for our identication strategy, European countries or parts of Germany did not
choose the French institutions, but those institutions were imposed on them rst by the Revo-
lution and then by Napoleon.3 Moreover, territorial expansion by French armies did not target
places with a greater future growth potential. Instead, it had two major objectives. The rst
was defensive, especially, in response to the threat of Austrian or Prussian (or later British)
attempts to topple the Revolutionary regime. The second was expansionary. This was partly
because of resource needs of the French Republic, and partly because of the ideology of the
French Revolution. In addition, in the early 1790s, the French sought to establish France's
`natural frontiers.'4 Finally, the purpose of the institutional reforms of the French Revolution
2These issues are also related to the classic historical debate about the extent to which the institutions of
the ancien r egime impeded capitalism and economic growth and whether or not the French Revolution played a
constructive or destructive role in European political development. The historical debate about the consequences
of the French Revolution is also about its impact on political institutions and democracy, which is beyond the
scope of the current paper.
3In most cases, there were local Jacobin (local radical) forces in the countries invaded by the French armies,
but the presence of such forces did not play a major role in determining which countres and cities were invaded
by the French. See, for example, Doyle (1989, Chapter 9).
4For example, the Revolutionary leader George Danton stated: \Les limites de la France sont marqu ees
par la nature, nous les atteindrons des quatre coins de l'horizon, du c^ ot e du Rhin, du c^ ot e de l'Oc ean, du
2was not to foster industrialization per se, though they may have achieved this objective as
a by-product of its major goal of destroying the grip of the aristocracy, oligarchy, and the
clergy on political and economic power.5 Therefore, to a rst approximation, we can think of
the imposition of the institutions of the French Revolution as an `exogenous treatment' and
investigate the economic implications of the radical French reforms.
We distinguish three denitions of `French treatment:' (1) length of French occupation
(in years), (2) a dummy for French control during the Revolutionary period prior to the
take-over of Napoleon in 9 November 1799 (18 Brumaire in the revolutionary calendar), (3)
a dummy for French control during the Napoleonic period up until 1815. Using all three
denitions, we nd reduced-form evidence, both across countries and within Germany, that
our main proxy for economic prosperity, urbanization rates, increased signicantly faster in
treated areas during the second half of the 19th century. We also supplement our cross-country
analysis with Maddison's GDP data. Maddison reports data for `Germany' and `Italy' prior
to their unication, rather than the independent polities which subsequently unied. Much
of the variation in French treatment, however, is within what became Germany and Italy,
so Maddison's data are much less appropriate than the urbanization data for our purposes.
Nevertheless, the ndings with GDP per-capita are similar, though on the whole weaker than
those using urbanization rates.
Within Germany, we provide supporting evidence using the expansion of railways and
the sectoral composition of employment, again suggesting that treated parts of Germany grew
more rapidly|in fact, industrialized more rapidly|after 1850. Using German data, we further
show a strong association between our measures of institutional reforms and French invasion
or control. Using this association as a rst stage, we also estimate instrumental-variables
models, which indicate large eects of institutional reforms on subsequent growth. Overall,
our results show no evidence that the reforms imposed by the French had negative economic
consequences. On the contrary, there is fairly consistent evidence from a variety of dierent
c^ ot e des Alpes. L a, doivent nir les bornes de notre r epublique." (speech to National Convention, January 31,
1793; quoted in Blanning 1983, p. 2). Grab (2003, p. 1) summarizes these motives and arguments as: \The
revolutionary governments justied the occupation of foreign lands, using the theory of `natural frontiers' and
declaring their intention or liberating oppressed people from tyrannical regimes."
5It is unlikely that the reforms were made specically to encourage industrial growth. Most likely, no one
at the turn of the 19th century could have anticipated the new technologies that were to arrive a few decades
later. The exception to this statement is textiles. By 1800 the British and others had established some new
technologies that increased productivity (e.g., in spinning) by an order of magnitude. Textiles are an important
part of the story in the Rhineland, discussed below, but there is no evidence that the French changed institutions
in the Rhineland specically because they foresaw great potential in the manufacture of cloth.
3empirical strategies that they had positive eects.
An important aspect of our ndings is that the positive eects of institutional reforms are
only visible in the second half of the 19th century. By 1850, treated areas show no dierential
growth or in some specications, slight (and insignicant) negative growth. This is not sur-
prising. The French reforms were accompanied by the disruptions caused by invasion and war
and this often had quite destructive and exploitative aspects (see, for instance, Blanning, 1983,
1986). Grab (2003, p. 1), for example, writes \the French armies requisitioned provisions and
imposed heavy war contributions on occupied regions, thereby alienating their populations."
Thus, the short-term impact of French invasion may have been negative. But this is unin-
formative about the impact of Revolution-imposed institutional changes. The most plausible
hypothesis|and our starting point|is that the major role of the reforms was in creating an
environment conducive to innovation and entrepreneurial activity. This environment mattered
most in the dissemination of the industrial revolution, which took place in Continental Europe
in the second half of the 19th century.6 Our evidence of positive eects in the second half of
the 19th century is consistent with this hypothesis.
There are several main conclusions from the evidence presented in this paper. First, the
results emphasize the role of institutions and institutional reforms in economic development.7
Second, our ndings are consistent with the view that the institutions of the ancien r egime
(guilds, feudal legacy in countryside, absence of equality before the law) impeded growth.
However, the fact that French reforms came as a bundle does not allow us to assess the rel-
ative importance of, for example, the abolition of guilds compared to the abolition of feudal
privileges. Third, they do not support the view that civil code and French institutions have
detrimental economic eects.8 Fourth, the evidence does not support the thesis that insti-
6This argument is similar to that of Engerman and Sokolo (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2002) who argue that the divergence of institutions in colonial societies, which took place between 1500 and
1800, had little economic impact until the age of industry.
7Also noteworthy is that unlike the experience of European colonialism in the wider world, the French did
not settle after 1815 in the parts of Europe they reformed and they did not build schools, so during this episode
there were large changes in institutions with culture, human capital and the ethnic composition of the population
remaining largely unchanged.
8This statement is subject to two obvious caveats, rstly, that the comparison is not to the common law,
and secondly, that it could be that the imposition of the civil code did have negative eects, but these were
more than compensated for by positive eects emanating from reforms simultaneously implemented with the
civil code. These caveats notwithstanding, if the civil code and other aspects of French institutions were highly
damaging to growth, particularly if imposed on other countries, we would expect to nd signicant negative
eects in treated areas. In addition, apart from parts of the world that voluntarily adopted the civil code, such
as Latin America, existing evidence on the consequences of the civil code comes from former French colonies
which, like the Europe we study, had the civil code imposed simultaneously with other French reforms.
4tutions are eciently adapted to the underlying characteristics of a society and that evolved
institutions are superior to those that are designed or externally imposed. The French Revolu-
tionary armies imposed new and radically dierent institutions from those existing previously,
and did so in extreme `Big Bang' style. Nevertheless, our evidence suggests that this was an
`economic success'. Taken together, these ndings are interesting for those who favor radi-
cal institutional reforms. They suggest these may be successful, at least in certain historical
contexts.
The success of the French reforms raises the question: why did they work when other
externally-imposed reforms often fail? Most likely this is because the reforms were much more
radical than is typically the case.9 The French reformed simultaneously in many dimensions
and weakened the powers of local elites, making a return to the status quo ante largely impossi-
ble. Even when some pre-revolution elites returned to power after 1815, there was a permanent
change in the political equilibrium. This scope and radicalism of the French reforms are com-
mon with the post-war reform experiences in Germany and Japan and stand in contrast with
many other reform experiences.
In addition to the literature on the implications and desirability of dierent types of insti-
tutional reforms, discussed above, our paper is related to a large literature on the consequences
of the French Revolution. The debate on the French Revolution was started in its modern form
by the pamphlet published by the conservative English philosopher Edmund Burke in 1790,
entitled Reections on the Revolution in France, which initiated controversies about institu-
tional change which continue today. In this pamphlet, Burke condemned the brutality, the
interventionist spirit and the radicalism of the French Revolution and argued:
\It is with innite caution that any man should venture upon pulling down an
edice, which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of
society, or on building it up again without having models and patterns of approved
utility before his eyes" Burke (1969, p.152).
The conclusion Burke drew from these events was that the negative impacts of the French
Revolution would be felt not only in France and not only in its immediate aftermath, but
would potentially change the world for many more decades or even centuries to come.
On the other side, the positive reception of the French Revolution was as enthusiastic as
Burke's condemnation. Thomas Paine, in a book that would subsequently become a classic for
9See Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) for a model in which limited reforms can be counterproductive.
5the democratization movements of the 19th-century Europe, The Rights of Man, responded to
Burke in 1791. Paine hailed the French Revolution as the harbinger of freedom and equality
before the law, a role that it achieved by demolishing the ancien r egime. Paine argued:
\It was ... against the despotic principles of the government, that the nation
revolted. These principles had ... become too deeply rooted to be removed, and
the Augean stable of parasites and plunderers too abominably lthy to be cleansed,
by anything short of a complete and universal revolution" Paine (1969, p. 69).
According to Paine, the French Revolution was exactly the kind of radical institutional reform
necessary to break the hold on land and people exercised by the ancien r egime, which was
not only morally abhorrent, but also the source of signicant economic ineciencies. The
Revolution would therefore pave the way for modern freedoms and democratic institutions by
removing serfdom, aristocratic privileges, the Church's domination over politics and land, and
inequity before the law.
The debate between Burke and Paine has not been resolved by academic research and there
is no consensus about the economic consequences of the French Revolution. On the one hand,
many economic historians, like Landes (1969, p. 142), view the French Revolution as \a po-
litical roadblock" to technological adoption for Continental countries, and conclude that as a
consequence of the Revolution, \the gap in technique [between the Continent and Britain] had
widened, while most of the fundamental educational, economic, and social obstacles to imita-
tion remained" (Landes, 1969, p. 147). Similarly, Buyst and Mokyr (1990, p. 64, 74) write: \it
is our contention ... that the Dutch economy in the years of the French and Napoleonic Wars
was another example of a small open commercial economy whose prosperity was disrupted by
world events ... The French period ... [was] disastrous for the Dutch economy." Crouzet's
(2001, p. 121) view is similar, noting \the French Revolution and the wars that followed greatly
slowed the transfer of technology."10
10Within the history profession the economic impact of the French Revolution has become inexorably inter-
twined with the Marxist interpretation of the revolution as marking the `rise of the bourgoisie'. Most historians
now reject a Marxist interpretation of the Revolution, but have not articulated an alternative assessment of its
implications. Other economic historians simply ignore the Revolution. In the literature on 19th century German
industrialization, for example, though it is common to argue that the Stein-Hardenberg Reforms in Prussia after
1807, which were induced by the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon at Jena, helped to modernize agriculture and
facilitate the reallocation of labor to industrial areas (e.g., Tilly, 1996), little mention is made of any potential
impact of French institutional reforms in Germany. The institutional reform most mentioned is the formation
of the Zollverein customs union in 1833.
6On the other hand, many other economic historians also agree with Mokyr's assessments
that \the Revolution's long-term eect was to clear up the debris of the ancien r egime on
the Continent, thus assuring Europe's ability eventually to follow Britain in revolutionizing its
productive system" (1990, p. 259), and that \the French Revolution and Napoleon installed
more forward looking governments in Europe" (1990, p. 253). Even Landes, who generally em-
phasizes the negative eects of the Revolution, also mentions in passing that such institutional
changes as the abolition of guilds were benecial (1969, pp. 144-145).11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the history of
the French Revolution and the subsequent invasion of Europe by the French. Section 3 discusses
our data. Section 4 provides country-level regression evidence investigating the reduced form
eect of treatment on our dependent variables. Section 5 looks at the dierences in the growth
experience of treated and untreated German polities. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Eect of the French Revolution on Europe
In this section, we provide a brief sketch of certain aspects of the French Revolution and the
situation in various neighboring countries and cities before the Revolution that are relevant
to our investigation. We also recount how expansion by the French Revolutionary armies and
later by Napoleon aected these areas.12 Further historical details are provided in Acemoglu,
Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2009).
The Revolution was precipitated by a long-running scal crisis which led to the convening
of the Estates-General in 1789 for the rst time since 1614. The initial meeting of the Estates-
General in Versailles on May 5, 1789 ended with the decision to convene a more powerful
body, the National Assembly, which initiated a process of radicalization culminating in the
storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789. The newly-formed National Constituent Assembly
abolished feudalism and all of the special privileges and rights of the First and Second Estates
on August 4, 1789. This was followed by the abolition of the Church's authority to levy special
taxes, and later turning the clergy into employees of the state, thus starting the process of the
separation of church and state. It subsequently passed a constitution on September 29, 1791,
11See also Crouzet (2001, p. 122), Cameron (1993, pp. 211-213) and Rosenthal (1992). Similarly, Rud e
(1964), Kisch (1962), Trebilcock (1981), Doyle (1989), or Grab (2003) also argue that the French reforms were
signicant improvements relative to the situation at the time. None of these works systematically investigates
the economic consequences of the Revolution either in the short or the long run.
12This section draws on Doyle (1989), Palmer (1959, 1964), Rud e (1988), Grab (2003), and Blanning (1983,
1986, 1996).
7making France a constitutional monarchy. This constitution also removed the major power of
the guilds in the cities.
The radicalization of the Revolution led to the Terror which ended with the execution of
Robespierre and Saint-Just in July 1794. There followed a phase of relative stability, rst in
the form of collective government under the Directory between 1795 and 1799, and then with
more concentrated power in the form of a three person Consulate, consisting of Ducos, Sieyes
and Napoleon Bonaparte. Already during the directory, the young general Bonaparte had
become famous for his military successes and statesmanship. His inuence was only to grow
after 1799. The Consulate soon became personal rule by Napoleon, who initially engineered
his election as First Consul in November 1799 with the coup of the 18th of Brumaire and then
declared himself emperor in 1804. The years between 1799 and the end of Napoleon's reign,
1815, witnessed a series of great victories, including those at Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstedt, and
Wagram, bringing continental Europe to its knees. They also allowed Napoleon to impose his
will (and his legal code) across a wide swath of territory.
2.1 Europe Before the Revolution
Before the age of the French Revolution, much of Europe was dominated by two kinds of oli-
garchies, the landed nobility in agriculture and the urban-based oligarchy controlling commerce
and various occupations, with explicit or implicit entry barriers.
By the end of the eighteenth century, feudalism in its most rigid form had disappeared
in many parts of Europe, but a lot of its remnants remained. Serfdom|the system through
which peasants are tied to the land and cannot sell their labor in free markets or engage in
other occupations without the permission of landowners|still continued in much of Eastern
Europe (see Blum, 1978), while it had been replaced by various forms of taxes and tributes to
landowners in other areas, which could nonetheless be quite onerous.13 For example, in the
Rhineland, the rst area in Germany to come under French control, an attenuated form of
serfdom (Grundherrschaft) which severely restricted freedom of movement was still practiced
(Blanning 1983, pp. 20-21). Grab (2003, p. 86) states: \Their conditions were worse east of
the Elbe where serfdom still prevailed. But even in many western regions where serfdom had
declined and peasants were freer and better o, they were often still subject to landlords to
13Since one could be concerned that including Eastern Europe in the sample leads the control group to be
very heterogeneous, in the empirical work we show that all our results hold when we restrict our sample to
Europe West of the Elbe.
8whom they owed seigneurial fees and labor obligations. In addition they had to pay taxes and
support their parishes and village communities."
Even when serfdom in its classic form was absent, various rights of the nobility and clergy
created a very unequal political and economic situation in rural areas. These groups were
frequently exempt from taxation by the state and enjoyed the right of taxation of the peasants
under their control. Lenger (2004, p. 92), for example, describes this as: \besides the origi-
nal obligations to provide services and dues to the lord the agricultural labor force was also
burdened with personal servitude". He continues:
\In the small territory of Nassau-Usingen around 1800 there were no less than 230
dierent payments, dues, and services that the peasants living there had to provide
to the lords. Dues included ... the `blood tithe' to be paid after an animal was
slaughtered, a `bee tithe', a `wax tithe' ... as well as large fees owed to the lord
whenever a piece of property changed hands." (Lenger, 2004, p. 96).
Moreover, in places where some form of seigneurial privilege remained, it was usual for nobility
and clergy to be subject to dierent laws and courts. The principle of equality before the law
was quite alien (or even revolutionary) in most of Europe in 1789.
The urban oligarchy was perhaps even more pernicious to industrialization. Almost all
major occupations were controlled by guilds, signicantly limiting entry into those professions
by others, and often restricting adoption of new technologies (see White, 2001, for examples
from French guilds). For example, Cipolla (1970) argues that the guilds stopped innovation
in Italy, in particular they forbade the production of exactly the type of lower quality goods
that were taking their markets. In Venice (p. 206) \for almost the whole of the 17th century,
the statutes of the guild prevented cloth from being made of the English and Dutch type,
which had had so much success on the international markets. Moreover, the guild statutes not
only demanded the production of a traditional type of goods, but also prevented the adoption
of new methods of making these old products." Braudel's (1992, p. 136) and Rapp's (1976)
analysis is similar. For the case of Germany, a similar argument is made by Ogilvie (2004,
2007) and Kisch (1989) for the Rhineland. In the major cities of Cologne and Aachen the
adoption of new textile (spinning and weaving) machines were signicantly delayed because
of guild restrictions. In addition, many cities were controlled by a few families for many
generations, amassing wealth at the expense of potential new entrants with greater ability or
better technologies.
92.2 Under the Republic
Despite the fact that the French Revolution was immediately seen as threatening to Europe's
elite, war|the so-called War of the First Coalition|did not break out until 1792.14 Contrary
to almost everyone's expectations, after some early defeats, the armies of the new Republic
were victorious in an initially defensive war. There were serious organizational problems to
overcome, but particularly after the introduction of mass conscription (the lev ee en masse) in
August 1793, the French had a military advantage than verged on supremacy.
Initial military success encouraged the Republic's leadership to expand France's borders,
with an eye towards creating an eective buer between the new Republic and the hostile
monarchs of Prussia and Austria. The French quickly seized present-day Belgium and the
Netherlands (where ice famously allowed French cavalry to capture a large part of the Dutch
navy). The French also gained eective control over much of modern-day Switzerland. In all
three places, the French had strong control through the 1790s.
Germany was initially hotly contested but by 1795 the French had rm control over the
Rhineland (the west or left bank of the Rhine), and the Prussians were forced to recognize this
fact under the Treaty of Basle.15 Between 1795 and 1802, the French rmly held the Rhineland,
but not any other part of Germany. In 1802 the Rhineland was ocially incorporated into
France.
Italy remained the main seat of war in the second half the 1790s, with the Austrians as
the main opponents. Savoy was annexed by France in 1792, and a stalemate was reached
until Napoleon's invasion in April 1796. In his rst major continental campaign, by early 1797
Napoleon had swept up almost all of Northern Italy, except for Venice (which was taken by
the Austrians). The Treaty of Campo Formio, signed with the Austrians in October 1797,
ended the War of the First Coalition and recognized a number of French-controlled republics
in Northern Italy.
However, the French continued to expand their control over Italy even after this treaty.
In March 1798 the French invaded the Papal States and established the Roman Republic. In
January 1799, Naples was conquered and the Parthenopean Republic created.16 With the
14The initial reaction in European capitals was amazement but there was no perceived need to intervene.
This changed with the execution of Louis XVI. See Doyle (1989) for general background and Blanning (1986)
for a more detailed treatment. Esdaile (1995, 2001) and Ellis (2003) are succinct overviews of all of the wars
from 1792 to 1815, while Blanning (1996) and Gates (1997) provide more details.
15Part of the broader 1795 Peace of Basle with Prussia, Spain, and Hessen-Kassel.
16The Parthenopean Republic was short-lived, but the French were soon back and|under Napoleon|seem to
10exception of Venice (still Austrian), the French now controlled the entire Italian peninsular ei-
ther directly (Savoy) or through satellite republics (Cisalpine, Ligurian, Roman, and Partheno-
pean). There was further back-and-forth in the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1801), but
this ended with the French essentially remaining in control.
2.3 Institutional Changes Induced by the Revolutionary Armies
Many of the most radical institutional changes were undertaken during the invasion of the
French Revolutionary armies. This included the abolition of all the remaining vestiges of
serfdom and quasi-feudal land relations, the hold of the clergy over economic and political
power, the domination of the guilds in urban areas, and legal changes establishing equality
before the law.
In Belgium \The clergy and the nobility, the two upper estates, enjoyed many privileges
and possessed considerable wealth and political power ... Urban guilds and corporations, the
dominant element in the Third Estate, also possessed important privileges and controlled the
towns" (Grab, 2003, p. 75). France annexed Belgium in 1795 and ruled for 20 years. Equality
before the law was established and seigneurial rights, the tithe, noble privileges, and the guilds
were abolished; in fact, from December 1796, any new French legislation became applicable in
Belgium (Grab, 2003, p. 78).
In the Netherlands (or United Provinces), the existing institutions were more those of en-
trenched urban oligarchies in the various cities. These oligarchies were eectively expropriated
by the French and, after considerable upheaval, the Batavian Republic was established along
French lines (Grab, 2003, Chapter 4).
In Switzerland, the situation was similar to the Netherlands. Before 1789, \Feudal priv-
ileges persisted in many rural communities. Peasants owed the Church and landlords tithe,
seigneurial fees, and labor services. Many Swiss lacked the freedom to settle where they wanted
to or choose the occupation they desired." (Grab, 2003, p. 113). With the coming of Rev-
olutionary armies, existing oligarchs were dispossessed or forced to cede power, and feudal
privileges largely disappeared.
In Germany, the only real changes during this period were in the Rhineland (West Bank
of the Rhine). While the impact of the French on the Rhineland during the 1790s remains
controversial, especially because of the great deal of plunder and the resulting resentment by
have had a great impact on some institutions in the south of Italy, on which see Davis (1991, 2003) or Gregory
(2001).
11the local population mentioned above (see, e.g., Blanning, 1983, Doyle, 1989), the importance
of the revolutionary reforms in Rhineland is not in question. Even a critic of the French, such
as Blanning (1983), admits the signicant institutional reforms undertaken by the French in
the Rhineland. Most signicantly, in 1798 the seigneurial regime and the guilds were abolished
(Blanning, 1983, pp. 137 and 155), and this paved the way to a relatively free labor market.
This was a major reform and meant that master artisans could (and did) set up their shops
when they wished to do so (Diefendorf 1980, p. 164). Equally important were the legal
changes. For example, the French created a commercial court in Aachen in 1794, and followed
with similar courts elsewhere in the Rhineland (Diefendorf, 1980, pp. 159-160), which were to
play an important role in the creation of commercial and industrial businesses in the years to
follow.
In Italy, several new Republics were established with French-style constitutions, parliaments
(on a property-based franchise), and more ecient systems of administration. Extensive aris-
tocratic privileges were abolished and the notion of equality before the law was introduced in
earnest for the rst time (see Doyle, 1989, Chapter 15, Grab, 2003, Chapter 10, Broers, 1997,
2005).
2.4 Napoleon At the Helm
After Napoleon's takeover, the French impact spread much wider throughout Europe. In Ger-
many, where the direct control of the Revolutionary armies had been limited to the Rhineland,
Napoleon constructed a string of satellite buer states on France's northeastern border. There
were several iterations, but the big break point followed the Peace of Lun eville (February
1801), with a massive reorganization of the territories that comprised the Holy Roman Empire
(roughly Austria and Germany in their 1914 borders). Much of the astonishing variety of the
Empire disappeared|literally hundreds of independent states, ecclesiastical territories and free
imperial cities vanished and were consolidated into a cluster of larger kingdoms, principalities,
and duchies; ultimately, their number shrank to fewer than 40 states (Grab, 2003, pp. 89-90).
The main beneciaries were the Grand Duchy of Baden and the kingdoms of W urttenberg and
Bavaria (all in the South of Germany). These and most other German states except Prussia
were brought together in 1806 in the Rheinbund, known in English as the Confederation of the
Rhine (see Schmitt, 1983).
At the same time, Napoleon proceeded to reorganize the territories in northwest Germany
12into satellite states under his control. The Duchy of Berg on the right bank of the Rhine was
formed in March 1806 (it was supposed to be ruled by his infant nephew Louis Napoleon),
the Kingdom of Westphalia (ruled by his brother J er^ ome) in August 1807, and the Duchy of
Frankfurt in February 1810 (it was planned that Napoleon's stepson, Eugene de Beauharnais,
would inherit it). These were run by the French and persisted until the collapse following
Napoleon's invasion of Russia. During this period Napoleon also took over parts of Northern
Germany, including in December 1810 the annexation into France of Hamburg, L ubeck and
Bremen (Hanseatic cities) and the plains of Lower Saxony, which would later comprise most
of the Kingdom of Hanover.
Elsewhere the French maintained their control over the Low Countries, and in 1808 in-
vaded Spain. In Italy Napoleon re-created the Cisalpine (subsequently Italian) and Ligurian
Republics and created the satellite state of the Kingdom of Etruria comprising the larger part
of Tuscany. By March 1802 the French commanded all of Italy except again the Papal States,
Naples and Venice. Piedmont was annexed to France in early 1803, and in 1805 Napoleon
turned the Italian Republic into the Kingdom of Italy (1805 to 1814) and the Ligurian Repub-
lic and Parma were made part of France. In 1806, the French again invaded southern Italy and
Napoleon installed his brother Joseph as the King of Naples. The Papal States were invaded
by the French in 1808, and most was annexed to France, forming the departments of Tiber
and Trasimene. In 1808, Joseph was made King of Spain, and the Kingdom of Naples passed
to Napoleon's brother-in-law, Joachim Murat.
2.5 Napoleon's Reforms
Although Napoleon was an Emperor seeking to solidify his control, ruthlessly when necessary, in
France and throughout the French Empire, he nonetheless continued to implement the reforms
initiated by the Revolutionary armies (see Grab, 2003, Connolly, 1965, and Woolf, 1991). As
Grab (2003, p. xi) puts it: \Revolutionary France had initiated many of these changes and
Napoleon exported them throughout Europe." Napoleon himself saw the imposition of the civil
code (Code Napol eon) in the areas he controlled as his most important reform (Lyons, 1994,
p. 94). In practice Napoleon's institutional legacy outside of France is complicated, especially
since he was more inclined to compromise with local elites at some times, but in most places
there was a genuine attempt to continue and deepen the reforms brought by the Revolution.
The motivation for the reforms seems to have been several. First, Napoleon had himself
13been deeply involved with the reforms of the Revolutionary period and seems to have shared the
ideological commitment of the early reformers. Second, like them, he wished to build a series
of buer states around France. Finally, reforms such as abolishing elites, feudal privileges and
introducing equality before the law undermined existing elites and made it easier for Napoleon
to establish control over the areas rule he conquered.17
In Germany, Napoleon sustained the reforms already introduced into the Rhineland par-
ticularly introducing the Code Napol eon. Kisch emphasizes the economic importance of this
(1989, p. 212): \When the many strands of commercial legislation were subsequently con-
solidated in the Code Napol eon, the Rhineland (on the left bank) was not only given a most
up-to-date legal framework, but also a system of government in close harmony with the needs
of a buoyantly industrializing society." The consequence of all of these changes was the trans-
formation of the Rhineland from an oligarchy-dominated area to one open to new business and
new entrants. Instead of the traditional oligarchy, in 1810 merchants/manufacturers comprised
about half the members of Conseil General (municipal administrations) in leading Rhineland
towns (Diefendorf, 1980, p. 115), and businesspeople were also well represented in the higher
department-level Conseil General.
Reforms were also systematically introduced into the German satellite kingdoms. For
example, Connelly (1965, p. 184) notes that in the constitution of Westphalia, which was
issued at Fontainebleau on November 15, 1807,
\ ... the king's subjects were guaranteed equality before the law and religious
liberty; serfdom and feudal rights were abolished; noble titles were armed, but
were to command no special rights, privileges or oces. Taxes were to fall equally
on all classes in all parts of the kingdom. Provision was made for a ministry, council
of state, and a parliament of one hundred (seventy landowners, fteen merchants
and manufacturers, fteen savants and distinguished citizens) ... Eective January
1, 1808, the Code Napol eon was to be the civil law. The judiciary was to be
`independent' but was appointed by the king, who could review his appointments
every ve years."
He later notes (p. 189) that \all vestiges of feudal law, together with seigneurial and church
17Prussia's desire to establish its own control seems to have been one of the reasons why it did not attempt
to dismantle French reforms in the parts of Western Germany that it took over after 1815 (see Fisher, 1903, pp.
380-381).
14courts, disappeared in the rst months of 1808" and \All men were equal before the law
and eligible for oce." Although the political changes were not implemented (the parliament
hardly met), the economic changes were profound and|in this case and in many others|
largely irreversible.
In the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, Napoleon consolidated the changes brought
by the Revolution, with an emphasis on establishing (his) legal code and a downplaying of any
move towards democracy.18
Napoleon's impact on Spain is controversial. Napoleon acquired nominal control over Spain
quite late (1808) and from that time on he had considerable distractions in the form of almost
continual major wars. The Code Napol eon was supposedly introduced, but it is unclear whether
it was ever properly implemented. There was also considerable popular resistance, abetted by
the British directly and through their base in Portugal, and by 1812 the French had lost
eective control south of the Pyrenees.
In Italy, the picture is similar with the Code Napol eon being implemented mainly in the
North, but also involving certain profound changes in the South.
2.6 Persistence of the French Reforms
After the nal collapse of Napoleon in 1815 the institutional reforms implemented over the
previous 25 years suered various fates. In our econometric analysis of Germany we speci-
cally code reforms throughout the 19th century so examine this issue empirically. As a rst
approximation, the reforms were most clearly persistent in places where the old elites did not
return, for example, in the areas of Napoleonic Germany that were ceded to Prussia at the
Congress of Vienna. For instance, Emsley (2003, pp. 62-63) notes:
\Yet on the left bank of the Rhine, in the departments annexed to France during
the revolutionary decade, the Code became rmly entrenched. Indeed, it was so
well entrenched that, after 1815, the Rhenish elite successfully preserved the Code
and resisted attempts of their new Prussian masters to introduce the Prussian
Allgemeines Landrecht."19
18Napoleon also briey invaded Portugal, but the French presence did not last long, partly due to British
intervention. We therefore treat Portugal as part of the control group, along with Austria (where Napoleon also
had military victories but never ruled directly).
19See Sperber (1989) and (1991) for details on the Rhinelanders tried (and succeeded for a long while) to hold
onto the Code Napol eon and other progressive aspects of the French legacy.
15Emsley's argument is that the French reforms fundamentally changed the political status
quo in such a way as the elites who benetted from these institutions could sustain the. The
presence of a new elite created by the reforms and determined to hang onto them is also central
to the argument of Simms (2004, p. 39) who sums this up as:
\In western and southern Germany there was no going back to the feudal sta-
tus quo ante. The Prussian bureaucrats arriving in the newly acquired Rhine
Province in 1815 found a population determined to hold onto the French law ... In
southern Germany the old corporate representations had permanently given way
to parliaments whose lower houses were largely elected on the basis of a property
franchise; and by 1820 all southern German states had constitutions guarantee-
ing freedom of conscience and equality before the law ... The genie of the reform
movement|freedom of movement, the standardization of taxation, the abolition
of guilds|could not be put back in the bottle."20
Although elsewhere, most notably in Hanover, there was much more of a return to the
status quo, these examples highlight a plausible mechanism via which the reforms may have
had enduring eects, even in places where the de jure aspects of French reforms were repealed
after 1815.
3 Data
In this section, we briey describe the four types of data we use for our empirical analysis. In
all cases, further details are contained in the Data Appendix.
3.1 Country and Polity Level Outcome Variables
We use two main data series to measure economic prosperity across countries and polities.21
Our rst measure of prosperity is the urbanization rate of a country or a polity, measured as
20Note that the southern states mentioned here|Baden, W urttemberg, and Bavaria|are not in our treatment
group of invaded countries. To the extent that defensive modernization promoted economic growth, this will
bias our result downwards, as we discuss later.
21Our units of observation are countries in their present-day borders where applicable, i.e., where political
entities during the 19th century are roughly corresponding to today's borders. For the cases of Italy and
Germany, two complicating factors occur: on the one hand, dierent regions of these countries experience
dierent types of French `treatment.' On the other hand, Italy and Germany are established as unitary states
only towards the end of the 19th century. Therefore, we consider 8 distinct pre-unitary polities in Germany,
and 12 such polities in Italy. For more details, refer to appendices 6 and 6.
16the percent of the population living in cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. We compute
urbanization rates for 41 polities (21 present-day states, 8 German and 12 Italian pre-unitary
states). Bairoch (1988, Chapter 1) and de Vries (1984, p. 164) argue that only areas with high
agricultural productivity and a developed transportation network could support large urban
populations. In addition, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) present evidence that both
in the time-series and the cross-section there is a close association between urbanization and
income per capita before as well as after industrialization. We take urbanization as the best
available proxy for GDP per capita. Urbanization estimates from Bairoch (1988) and the city
level population data from Bairoch, Batou and Ch evre (1988) are fairly reliable and build on
the work of many economic historians.22 In addition, urbanization at this stage of European
development is likely highly correlated with the growth of industrial activity based in cities.
We also use estimates of GDP per capita for national polities from Maddison (2003). The
numbers before 1820 are in many cases educated guesses by Maddison. Furthermore, because
these estimates are constructed for modern polities, such as Germany or Italy, they do not
allow us to exploit the considerable variation within Germany and Italy. Maddison's estimates
start in 1500, and are available for 1600, 1700, 1820, and then more frequently. We use the
results with the GDP per capita estimates as a check on our urbanization rate results.
For Germany, we also collected data from the 19th century of the extent of railway networks
and also the distribution of the population across dierent sectors of the economy (industry,
commerce and agriculture). The sources for all these variables are listed in Appendix 6.
3.2 Coding French Treatment
We focus on three related measures of French treatment; these are summarized in Table 1 for all
states in our datasets. The rst records for each country the years of French occupation between
the entire period 1792 and 1815. We consider years in which the French had direct control
over these territories or installed republics and principalities directly dependent on French
directives; we exclude years and months of pure military occupation, such as for example in
the case of Prussia.
Our second measure is binary and reports as treated the areas invaded by the French
22The complete city level population dataset has information on all 2,200 European cities which had, at some
time between 800 and 1800, 5,000 or more inhabitants. City level populations are added up and divided by total
population, as garnered from McEvedy and Jones (1978), Lahmeyer (n.d.) or Maddison (2003). The Bairoch et
al. dataset stops in 1850; therefore, we resort to ocial statistics of that period to estimate urbanization rates
after that date. More details on the construction of urbanization gures are provided in Appendix 6.
17revolutionary armies, thus the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, most of northern and central
Italy as well as the Rhineland. The third measure includes countries occupied by Napoleon.
This adds Spain, Poland, most of Italy and the northwest of Germany. The untreated countries
are all those in Europe which were not occupied and for which we have data. This includes
Britain, Portugal, Austria, Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and the southern and eastern German
states Baden, W urttemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia. To the extent that some of these
implemented modernizing reforms under pressure from France, through the implicit or explicit
threat of invasion, this coding works against our hypothesis and biases our results downwards.
3.3 Coding Institutional Reforms in Germany
In the last part of our analysis, we also use an index of reforms in Germany, both to show the
impact of the French occupation on institutional reforms and as the right-hand side variable
in our instrumental-variables strategy. For our 8 polities in Germany we were also able to
use historical sources to code the nature of some of the reforms that took place. The reforms
we focus on are the enactment of written legal codes including the French civil code, the
restructuring of agricultural relations, the abolition of guilds, and the emancipation of Jews.
We interpret these reforms as a proxy or index for the overall set of institutional reforms,
which also include changes in the nature of state administration or tax collection and the
secularization of church lands. We are not able to construct measures of these reforms that are
comparable across dierent areas of Germany (for example, the secularization of church lands
was only relevant for Catholic territories). Table 2 shows the incidence of reforms in Germany.
Looking rst at the top panel of Table 2, the rst three columns report the treatment status
for the 8 German polities for each of the three denitions of treatment. Column 1, for example,
shows that only what was to become the Prussian Rhine Province (the Rhineland) was treated
during the Revolutionary period. In column 2, the Napoleonic treatment also includes Hanover
and Westphalia (the latter also became part of Prussia after 1815). In column 3 we record
the years of French control, which ranges for 19 years for the Rhineland to just 3 years for
Hanover.
The next four columns record the date at which the dierent polities introduced the various
reforms on which we focus. Appendix 6 describes in detail how we coded these reform dates
and the sources we used. The rst is the date at which a written legal code was introduced.
The gures in this column indicate both the presence of a written civil code, and of a system
18of commercial law, represented either by the French code de commerce, or by the Prussian
Allgemeines Landrecht (ALR).23 The Napoleonic civil code was introduced in 1805 in French-
occupied Rhineland and in 1808 in Westphalia. Other places such as Bavaria did not have such
a code until 1900. Note that although Baden was never treated it introduced a version of the
French civil code in 1810. The next column examines agrarian reform, eectively abolition of
serfdom or alternative feudal landholding arrangements, such as the Grundherrschaft, prevalent
in south and west Germany (though in many cases peasants had to pay a compensation to
their landlords). These reforms seem to have been relatively ineective during the Napoleonic
period itself even in the treated areas with the exception of the Rhineland. Column 6 of the
table records when guilds were abolished. As this column reports, the abolition of guilds was
one of the reforms most assiduously implemented by the French, but something that only
happened elsewhere in Germany some 50 years later. Finally, column 7 presents data on the
emancipation of the Jews. Though some historians have argued for the importance of this
(Ferguson, 1998), the evidence does not suggest that these reforms were actually enacted very
eectively. In most German states, full formal emancipation had to wait until the second half
of the 19th century to be implemented.
In column 8 we construct a simple index of reforms at two exemplary dates, 1850 and
1900 for each polity by simply adding the number of years each particular reform had been
in place and dividing by 4. As an example, consider Hanover, which was taken over by the
French for such a brief period that reforms were not implemented. By 1850 there had yet to
be a written civil code; agrarian reform had been in place for 19 years; guilds had not been
abolished; and Jews had not been emancipated. Therefore the value of the index for Hanover
in 1850 is 19/4=4.75. This index shows a clear distinction between parts of western Germany
that were reformed by the French, those places which defensively modernized, like Prussia or
Baden, and the rest of Germany. In 1850, for instance, the reform index was 33.5 for the
Rhineland and 27.25 for Westphalia. The fact that it was 31.25 for Prussia and 26.25 for
Baden shows how important the IV strategy is to avoid our results being biased by defensive
modernization. Figure 1 plots the reform index over time showing the divergence between
treated areas (Rhineland, Westphalia), defensive modernization areas (Prussia, Baden) and
the rest of Germany.
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports some of the data in an intuitive form. We show
23The French implemented the civil code and the commercial code simultaneously and the ALR includes both
types of codes, so we emphasized the timing of the introduction of both types of legal codes.
19the average date that dierent reforms were implemented, by treatment status. For instance,
looking at the average date when guilds were abolished for polities which got the Napoleonic
treatment, we see from column 6 that this was 1826, compared to 1853 for the control group.
The last row of the table reports the correlation coecient between the years of French control
and the date when particular reforms were implemented. For example, in column 4 we see that
the correlation between the date of introduction of a written civil code and years of French
presence is -0.398, so there is a sizable negative correlation|more years of French presence
is correlated with an earlier introduction of a civil code. As will be clear from the table, the
correlation with respect to the abolition of guilds is the largest.
3.4 Other Data
We also use a variety of other data as controls, in particular the proportion of the population
of a polity who are Protestant, the latitude of the capital city of the polity, and initial values
of the dependent variable.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3A records some basic descriptive statistics of the complete cross-national dataset with
the standard deviations in parentheses below the means. Panel A focuses on the urbanization
dataset, while panel B examines the countries in the dataset with GDP per-capita.
The table consists of ve columns. The rst ve rows describe urbanization rates in the
ve time periods considered; this evolution is also depicted in Figures 2A and 2B. One sees
that the urbanization rate prior to the revolutionary period was larger in polities that were
invaded by the Revolutionary armies compared to those that were not. The same is true with
respect to the Napoleonic treatment. This suggests that invaded countries were richer in 1700
and also 1800. Nevertheless, until 1800-1850 the urbanization rates of the two groups do not
display dierent evolutions (if anything, there is a slight convergence of the untreated group
toward the treated group). So there seems to be little evidence of dierential trends before the
French Revolution. After 1850, there is a marked take-o of the treated states relative to the
rest.
The next three rows of the table report summary statistics for the treatments status vari-
ables. Countries not invaded by French Revolutionary Armies still have 2.03 years of French
presence on average (column 3), since they were later under Napoleonic control. The next row
shows average latitude, which does not vary signicantly between the treatment and control
20groups. The nal row of this panel records the averages of our `Protestant' variable, which
shows that untreated polities are in general more likely to be Protestant.
Panel B of Table 3A shows some similar patterns. The sample is smaller now (since we
do not have income variations within Germany or Italy) but we see that in 1700 income per-
capita was higher in treated than in untreated areas and remained so throughout the period of
analysis. The picture with respect to latitude and Protestantism is also qualitatively similar.
In Table 3B we turn to descriptive statistics for the 8 German polities. In contrast to the
whole sample we can see that, at least for the Napoleonic treatment,24 there is little dierence
between the urbanization levels of treatment and control groups prior to 1789. This is also
shown in Figures 3A and 3B. Indeed, in 1750 urbanization is slightly greater in the control
group. Subsequently, however, urbanization grows more rapidly in the treatment group so that
by 1900 it is a full 10 percentage points higher in areas occupied by Napoleon.
4 Cross-Country Regression Evidence
In this section we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to investigate the cross-country
reduced-form relationship between our three measures of treatment and the two basic outcome
variables, urbanization rates and log GDP per capita. In all cases we have a panel dataset.
For GDP per capita, the time periods are unevenly spread (e.g., from Maddison, 2003, we have
income per capita for 1600, 1700, 1820, 1850, 1870, 1890 and 1900). For urbanization we have
data for the periods 1700, 1750, 1800, 1850 and 1900.25
Our basic reduced-form regression model is as follows:
yjt = dt + j +
X
t2T pre
t  Dt  Ij +
X
t2T post
t  Dt  Ij + X0
jt + "jt; (1)
where yjt is the outcome variable (urbanization or log GDP per capita) in country j at time
t, the dt's denote a full set of time eects, the j's denote a full set of country (polity) xed
eects, Xjt is a vector of other covariates, which will be included in some of the robustness
checks, and "jt is a disturbance term. The key variable of interest for us is the treatment
variable Ij, which is either a dummy denoting polities treated by the French Revolutionary
armies/by Napoleon or the number of years of French occupation. The coecients of interest
24Recall that for Germany the Revolutionary treatment aects only the Rhineland, which is why there are
no standard deviations.
25The urbanization dataset is balanced except for Hanover and Bavaria in 1700, and the GDP per capita
dataset is balanced except for Russia in 1850 and 1890.
21are thus
P
t2T pre t and
P
t2T post, where T pre is the set of years before and T post is the set
of years after treatment, which together allow us to look at both pre-trends and post-French
Revolution dierential eects (
P
t2T t  Dt  Ij stands for a separate interaction for each t in
T ). Under our hypothesis that French occupation was `econometrically exogenous', we expect
the coecients ftgt2T pre not to be signicantly dierent from zero, and under our hypothesis
that the French reforms were benecial for long-run economic growth, we expect ftgt2T post
to be positive.
Throughout the paper, all standard errors are robust, clustered at the country/polity level
to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix capturing potential serial correlation in
the residual error term (see Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 7).26
4.1 Main Results: Urbanization
We start in Table 4 with our preferred measure of prosperity in the 19th century, urbanization
rates, as the dependent variable, yjt. The rst column uses years of French occupation as the
treatment, while the second uses invaded by the French during the Revolutionary period as the
treatment. Column 3 uses invasion during the Napoleonic period as the treatment. Finally,
column 4 uses years of French presence but weights the polities by their population in 1700.
The set T post includes the treatment years 1850 and 1900, T pre comprises 1750 and 1800,
with 1700 as the omitted year. In column 1 we see that ^ 1850 =  0:236 with a standard
error of 0:154, so that by 1850 there was a negative, though relatively small and statistically
insignicant eect of years of French presence on the growth of urbanization. By 1900, however,
a signicant positive eect occurs. Indeed, ^ 1900 = 0:899 (standard error=0.382). Importantly,
there is no evidence of a pre-trend favoring the treated areas. The coecients ^ 1750 and ^ 1800
are in fact negative, but statistically insignicant.27
The patterns in columns 2 and 3, which use dummies for control by the French Revolu-
26The Huber-White standard errors turn out to be smaller than the standard errors clustered at the coun-
try/polity level in almost all cases. So our use of the fully robust variance-covariance matrix is conservative
except for the possibility that asymptotic approximations may not be valid because of the limited numbers of
clusters. As a remedy for this last possibility, we also discuss how using the alternative wild bootstrap procedure
suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) aects the signicance levels of our estimates.
27One concern, already mentioned in footnote 26, is that the number of clusters in Table 4 is relatively small
(41 polities). As a potential check, we also computed the signicance levels for our parameter estimates using the
wild bootstrap procedure (based on the t-statistics with the null hypothesis imposed) as suggested by Cameron,
Gelbach and Miller (2008). We computed the signicance levels using 1000 replications. This procedure has
little eect on the signicance levels of the results in Table 4. For example, in column 1 the p-value for ^ 1900
increases slightly from 0.024 to 0.034, and the p-value of the F-test of joint signicance of the coecients 1850
and 1900 changes from 0.001 to 0.008. Similar results apply to the other estimates in Table 4.
22tionary armies and by Napoleon as the measure of French treatment, and in column 4, which
uses weighted regressions (using population in 1750 as weights), are similar to that in column
1. We continue to nd a negative and insignicant eect of being occupied by the French in
1850, and a positive and signicant eect in 1900. The estimates of the coecient 1900 are
not statistically signicant in columns 2 and 4. Nevertheless, in all cases, the F-test shows that
the 1850 and 1900 interactions are jointly signicant, reecting the fact that the dierences
between the 1850 and 1900 coecients are statistically signicant in all specications.
However, the pre-1800 coecients are now larger, and in column 2 and 4, they are statis-
tically signicant. This raises the possibility of potential mean reversion, which may confound
our estimates. To deal with this concern, we report results from models that explicitly allow
for mean reversion in the next subsection.
The quantitative eects implied by these estimates are economically large but reasonable.
For example, the estimate of 1900 in column 1 implies that by 1900 countries that experienced
10 years of French control had urbanization rates almost 9 percentage points higher. This is
a large eect relative to mean urbanization in 1900 which was 41.2% for the entire sample,
suggesting an increase of close to 22% (or half a standard deviation) in the urbanization
rate. The eects estimated for 1900 in columns 2 and 3 using treatment dummies are also
quantitatively very similar.
Overall, these results show no evidence of a negative eect of French occupation. On the
contrary, they suggest that polities invaded and reformed by the French experienced more
rapid urbanization and economic growth after 1850. We nd it reasonable that the positive
eects of the French Revolution exhibit themselves after 1850, since, as discussed in Section 2,
the main role of the French reforms was to remove the barriers against industrialization and
industrial technology and such practices did not spread in continental Europe until the second
half of the 19th century.
4.2 Robustness
Tables 5 and 6 investigate the robustness of our initial results. In Table 5 we re-estimate the
basic model from column 1 of Table 4, focusing on years of French presence as our measure of
French treatment, and add some simple covariates. Column 1 reproduces column 1 of Table
4. In column 2 we add, as covariate vector Xjt, latitude interacted with a full set of time
dummies to allow for a time varying impact of geography (i.e.,
P
t t Dt latitudej). Table 5,
23column 2 shows that though the interactions between latitude and time eects are statistically
signicant, controlling for these interactions has no eect on the estimated eects of French
treatment.28
In column 3, we include a full set of interactions between initial urbanization yj1750 and
the full set of year dummies (i.e.,
P
t t Dt yj1750, where 1750 is the rst date with complete
urbanization gures for all polities). This is a exible (and demanding) way of controlling
for any pre-existing trends and mean reversion. The negative and sometimes statistically
signicant estimates before 1800 shown in Table 4 raise the possibility that there might be
signicant mean reversion in economic growth during this era, potentially confounding our
estimation strategy. Nevertheless, this exible specication has little eect on our estimates.
For example, ^ 1900 is now 0.85 (standard error= 0.396) and the interactions between initial
urbanization and the year dummies are also statistically insignicant.
In column 4, we include a full set of interactions between year dummies and our `Protestant'
variable. Several inuential social scientists have argued for the importance of the Protestant
work ethic in causing or at least facilitating industrialization (e.g., Weber, 1905, Landes, 1998).
Although there is some evidence of dierential growth of Protestant countries (the set of
interactions between Protestantism and the time dummies is signicant at the 5% level), the
inclusion of this set of covariates only strengthens the dierential growth eect of French
treatment. Column 5 nally includes all of these interactions jointly. Our estimates are again
largely unaected.
In Table 6 we conduct a variety of other robustness checks again restricting attention
to years of French presence as our measure of French treatment. In column 1 for ease of
comparison we again reproduce the regression from column 1 of Table 4. In the second column
we drop the United Kingdom, since the British were the industrial leader at the time and their
industrialization trajectory may have been unaected by the French Revolution. This again has
little impact on our results; ^ 1900 is now estimated to be slightly larger and highly signicant.
Eastern Europe, where serfdom was more widespread, may also be a poor control for more
western areas. Motivated by this reasoning, in column 3 we drop both the United Kingdom
and Eastern Europe. The basic pattern remains unchanged, though with a slightly smaller
coecient ^ 1900. In column 4, we drop Germany and Italy, as a preparation for the results
28As with the results in Table 4, those in Tables 5 and 6 are robust to using the wild bootstrap procedure
to compute p-values, and our estimates remain signicant at conventional levels. For example, using the same
procedure as in footnote 27, the p-value for ^ 1900 in column 2 changes from 0.025 to 0.028, and the p-value of
the F-test of joint signicance of the coecients 1850 and 1900 increases from 0.001 to 0.014.
24using Maddison's data, where we cannot distinguish across German and Italian sub-national
polities. In this case, the qualitative pattern of the results is similar, but ^ 1900 is much smaller
and statistically insignicant. This already constitutes a warning about the interpretation of
the results using Maddison's GDP estimates, where we will lose all of the within Germany and
Italy variation.
The remaining columns of Table 6, allow for mean reversion using the alternative strategy
of explicitly introducing the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. To ensure
consistency, these models are estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
strategy suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The results are generally similar to the OLS
estimates without the lagged dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable itself is
insignicant.
Also noteworthy is that in all of these specications, we do not nd evidence of pre-trends
favoring areas subsequently occupied by the French. We nd this reassuring for our overall
empirical strategy.
4.3 Results with GDP Per Capita
Table 7 reports estimates of equation (1) using GDP per capita as the dependent variable.
The baseline specication, reported in columns 1, 2, and 3, excludes Italy and Germany, since
these countries comprise both treated and untreated sub-national polities. In addition, the
set T pre (for the pre-trend specication tests) now includes 1700 and 1820 (even though there
may already be some eect in 1820), while T post includes 1850, 1870, 1890 and 1900. With all
three measures of French treatment, there is no evidence of signicant eects before 1850. The
coecients for 1850 and thereafter are all positive and individually statistically signicant in
columns 1 and 2. In column 3, where we use the dummy variable for control by Napoleon, the
eects are not statistically signicant.29 The quantitative magnitudes of the estimates are also
similar to the results with urbanization rates. For example, the estimate of ^ 1900 in column 2,
0.359, implies that by 1900 countries that were occupied by the French Revolutionary armies
would have reached about 36% higher per capita income relative to unoccupied countries.
The remainder of Table 7 focuses on the measure of years of French presence and reports
specications that also include Italy and Germany (column 4), excludes the United Kingdom
29However, in contrast to the results in Tables 4-6, the statistical signicance of the estimates in this table is
not robust to using bootstrapped p-values. Typically, the p-value of the F-statistic resulting from a test of joint
signicance of all post-1820 coecients increases to approximately 0.5 and is thus highly insignicant. This
suggests that the results using GDP per capita should be interpreted with caution.
25(column 5), also excludes Eastern Europe (column 6) and includes a full set of latitude, Protes-
tant an initial GDP time interactions (column 7). The overall pattern is similar. None of the
specications show statistically signicant dierential eects before 1850, and all specications
show positive eects after (and including) 1850. While individual coecients are insignicant
in many specications, the F- tests for the joint signicance of all post-1820 interactions (1850
onwards) in all cases indicate that there is signicantly faster growth in countries occupied by
the French after 1850.
In sum, results using Maddison's GDP estimates also show no evidence that the French
evolution have negative economic consequences. In fact, the estimates show a positive eect of
the French revolution, particularly after 1850 (though this is less robust than the results with
urbanization). As we mentioned in the Introduction, however, using this GDP data entails
discarding a considerable amount of variation in treatment, which comes from the within Italy
and within Germany experiences. This is the reason why we have emphasized the urbanization
data as our main dependent variable.
5 Within-German Evidence
The results so far indicate that countries where the French Revolution imposed radical insti-
tutional reforms, such as the abolition of feudal land relations and the power of the guilds,
experienced faster growth in the second half of the 19th century, particularly after the industri-
alization process got underway in earnest in continental Europe. We now look at the variation
within Germany, which is useful for several reasons. First, it will enable us to focus on a
sample of polities that were more homogeneous than the whole set of European countries at
the turn of the 19th century. Second, the greater availability of data will allow us to pinpoint
more precisely when in the second part of the 19th century the divergence between occupied
and unoccupied areas may have started. Finally and most importantly, we will be able to use
detailed data on institutional reforms and other outcome variables to further investigate the
implications of the reforms imposed by the French Revolution.
5.1 Reduced-Form Results
We rst examine reduced-form models similar to those estimated in Tables 4-6, but for the 8
German polities for which we have urbanization data. Our estimating equation is identical to
(1), with yjt again corresponding to the urbanization rate, but now dened for to sub-national
26German polities. The rest of the variables are dened similarly to those in equation (1): the
dt's denote a full set of time eects, the j's denote a full set of city eects, Xjt is a vector
of other covariates, and "jt is the error term. The dummy Ij is again the treatment status
dened in the same three ways.
Our baseline sample now consists of the years 1700, 1750, 1800, 1850, 1875, 1880, 1885,
1890, 1895, 1900, 1905 and 1910; we are thus able to take advantage of the richer information
we have about urbanization within Germany as compared to the rest of Europe. We take the
set T post to consist of the years between 1850 and 1910, while the set T pre (for the pre-trend
specication check) consists of 1750 and 1800. 1700 is the omitted category.
The estimates from the baseline models are reported in Table 8. The rst column uses years
of French presence as the treatment. There is again no evidence of dierential growth before
1850: ^ 1750 and ^ 1800 are small and statistically signicant. In contrast, ^ 1850 is positive,
though insignicant. By 1875 there is a statistically signicant eect of treatment with ^ 1875
equal to 0.71 (standard error= 0.20). In addition, the dierential growth continues thereafter so
that by 1910 we have ^ 1910 = 1:07 (standard error= 0.37). This indicates that the dierential
eects of French treatment start relatively early in the second part of the 19th century (certainly
well before 1900). Quantitative magnitudes are comparable as well, but somewhat larger than
those from the cross-country estimates. For example, the coecient of ^ 1900 = 0:99 indicates
that a polity that experienced 10 years of French control, on average, achieved about 10
percentage points higher urbanization relative to unoccupied areas.30
In column 2 we use invasion of Revolutionary armies as our measure of French treatment.
Recall that in the German context, this is simply testing for dierential growth of urbanization
in the Rhineland versus the rest of Germany. The pattern here is similar to that in column
1, with the estimated eect becoming signicant in 1875, the size of the coecient increasing
over time and the signicance level remaining high. In column 3 we use the dummy variable
for occupation by Napoleon; the results are again broadly similar.
In column 4, we use the years of French control measure and exclude the part of Prussia
that was not incorporated into Napoleon's satellite kingdom, which lies for the most part east
of the Elbe. This is a useful check since the eastern German areas with stronger feudal labor
relations may be less comparable to, and thus are worse control, for polities occupied by the
30As in Table 7 (and in contrast to Tables 4-6), these results are not robust to using wild bootstrapped
signicance levels. For example, in column 1, the p-value for the test of joint signicance of all post-1800
coecients increases from 0.000 to 0.360.
27French. In the event, the results in column 4 are very similar to those in column 1 and indicate
that our ndings are not given by a comparison of the west and east of the Elbe.31
Columns 5-7 focus on the years of French control measure and include interactions of
Protestant, latitude and initial urbanization with linear time trends, while column 8 weights
the data by population in 1700. The results are similar to those in column 1. Finally, column 9
reports results from a specication including a lagged dependent variable. For this specication,
we only include the years 1700, 1750, 1800, 1850, 1900, to obtain a panel dataset with evenly
spaced time intervals. The estimates are again similar to those in column 1.
Overall, the evidence in Table 8 is consistent with that presented in the previous sections.
In fact, the eects of French treatment are somewhat more precisely estimated, and because we
have more frequent observations, we can see the eects occur as early as 1875. We conclude, in
line with our results from the previous section, that there is no evidence of a negative economic
impact of the French Revolution; on the contrary, there is considerable evidence indicating that
areas occupied by the French grew considerably faster in the second half of the 19th century.
5.2 Instrumental-Variables Models in Germany
One advantage of our within Germany analysis is that we can verify the impact of French
treatment on institutional reforms and then also estimate models where all of the eects of
French occupation are assumed to work through institutions. In particular, we posit the
following simple relationship between our index of institutional reform and French occupation:
Rjt = dt + j +    t  Tt>1800  Ij + jt; (2)
where Rjt is the value of the reform index for polity j in Germany at time t, which was
introduced in the context of Table 1 above. dt and j are time eects and polity xed eects
and as usual Ij is our treatment variable, which in this section we take to be years of French
presence. jt is a disturbance term. The variable Tt>1800 is a dummy for post-1800 dates, so
that tTt>1800 is a linear time trend that turns on after 1800 (and is equal to 0 before then).32
31The results including the areas East of the Elbe are useful, on the other hand, because they provide evidence
against a related but dierent hypothesis that part of the eects of French occupation within Germany are partly
(or largely) due to defensive modernization eorts of Prussia (itself triggered by the French Revolution). After
the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Prussia took over large parts of Napoleonic Western Germany including the
Rhineland and Westphalia. As noted in footnote 17, this is part of the explanation for why institutional reforms
were not reversed in Germany after Napoleon's fall. Nevertheless, our interpretation is that the within-Germany
results are unlikely to be due to such a Prussian eect. First, the general pattern is similar for the whole of
Europe. Second, in Germany much of Prussia is itself in the control group.
32To simplify the interpretation of coecients, time t is divided by 1000.
28We start with this simpler form in (2), because in the second stage we are interested in the
main eect of institutional reforms and thus using a full set of time interactions as instruments
might exaggerate the strength of our rst-stage relationship. We return to a specication in
which the full set of time interactions are used in the rst stage in columns 3 and 4.
The second-stage equation is
yjt = dt + j +   Rjt + jt; (3)
where yjt is urbanization, dt and j are time eects and polity xed eects.
Table 9 shows the results of estimating (3) using OLS and two-stage least squares. Column
1 is for the entire Germany using years of French presence as the measure of French treatment.
Panel A shows estimates (3) using OLS for comparison. The reforms index has a positive
and statistically signicant eect on urbanization with an estimated coecient of ^  = 0:368
(standard error=0.13).
Panel B depicts estimates of equation (2). It shows a strong rst stage with the coecient
on the interaction between the post dummy and years of French presence being ^   = 0:711
(standard error=0.25). The strong rst-stage relationship indicates that even though there
were reforms in German areas not occupied by the French (most likely due to defensive mod-
ernization as in Baden and in Prussia), occupation by the French was a signicant determinant
of reform.
Panel C reports the second stage. These results show that the impact of reforms on urban-
ization is also highly signicant, now with a larger coecient ^  = 0:658 (standard error=0.21).
The greater magnitude of this coecient is not surprising in view of the fact that the OLS
coecient is likely to be subject to considerable attenuation, both because the extent of re-
form is measured with error and also because, conceptually, our reforms are only proxies for a
broader range of institutional reforms undertaken during this era.33 Column 2 repeats these
regressions excluding the East of the Elbe and shows very similar results to column 1.
Columns 3 and 4 reestimate the same models as in columns 1 and 2, but instead of a
linear interaction of time with years of French presence in the rst stage, they include a full
set of interactions between post-1800 dummies and years of French presence (as in equation
(1)). We do not show the corresponding rst stages in Panel B to save space. This exercise
is useful for two reasons. First, the very similar coecients in columns 3 and 4 show that
33The results in this table are weakened by the use of the wild bootstrap-t method, with the level of signicance
for ^  typically increasing to around or just above 10%.
29using the linear time interaction in (2) is not important for our results. Second, because with
this specication we have more instruments than endogenous regressors, we can perform an
overidentication test of the validity of the instruments. Economically, this amounts to testing
whether we can reject the hypothesis that all of the eects of the post-1800 time interactions
with French occupation work through the reforms index. To perform the overidentication test,
we use the Huber-White variance-covariance matrix without clustering, since this corresponds
to smaller standard errors and thus stacks the cards against our hypothesis. The results show
that the overidentication tests are very far from rejecting the above-mentioned hypothesis.
This gives some support to our interpretation that French occupation impacted urbanization
and economic growth in German polities in the second half of the 19th century mainly through
the reforms that the French imposed.
Columns 5-8 include interactions between Protestant, latitude and initial organization and
linear time trends (these models again only include a linear interaction of time with years of
French presence in the rst stage, as in (2)). These controls have little eect on the results.
Finally, column 8 reports weighted regressions, again showing a very similar pattern to the
results in column 1.
Overall the results in this section are consistent with our interpretation that occupation by
the French induced signicant institutional reforms and these reforms paved the way for more
rapid economic growth particularly in the second half of the 19th century.
5.3 Other German Outcome Variables
Our focus so far on urbanization rates and GDP per-capita was driven by our desire to check
for pre-trends|both of these variables allowed us to see whether there were dierential changes
before the French Revolution. The lack of such pre-trends so far motivates us to look at other
proxies for economic growth and industrialization in the 19th century. More specically, we
focus on the length of railway tracks in the area and the sectoral composition of employment,
which are available for German administrative units in the 19th century, but not before.
Given the absence of pre-French Revolution data, we adopt a simpler strategy in this
subsection. We report a series of cross-sectional regressions of the form:
yjt = dt + t  Ij + "jt (4)
for each t. Here yjt is again the outcome variable (railways or sectoral shares) in district j at
time t, dt now denotes a year-specic constant, Ij again represents years of French presence
30in district j, "jt is a disturbance term, and t's are the coecients of interest. In particular,
changes in t's can be interpreted as dierential growth related to French treatment.
Data on railways construction are available at the level of districts (Regierungsbezirke). In
our dataset, districts have an average size of 12,000 square km and a population of 1.15 million
inhabitants. Data until 1874 are available only for Prussia, from 1880 onwards for the entirety
of the German Empire. There are 35 districts in Prussia, 38 in the rest of Germany. We are
thus able to look at railways in the years 1859, 1864, 1869, 1874, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895.
Table 10 shows the results of estimating equation (4) with the left-hand side variable as log
kilometers of railways in district j. The regressions for 1859, 1864, 1869, and 1874, show no
signicant dierences in railway tracks by years of French presence both in the entire Germany
and in the West of the Elbe. However, by 1880 (after the non-Prussian districts are added to
the dataset) we nd signicantly more railway tracks in areas occupied by the French. These
dierences are conrmed in subsequent periods, particularly when attention is conned to the
West of the Elbe.
Table 11 turns to the sectoral shares of employment. Economic progress in the 19th century
was associated with a move out of agricultural activities and into the industrial and manufac-
turing sectors. We exploit variation across districts in sectoral shares of employment, based on
data assembled by Frank (1994) for four points in time: 1849, 1882, 1895, and 1907. The re-
sults in Table 11 show that by 1849 there was already less agriculture and greater industry and
manufacturing employment in areas occupied by the French, though these dierences are not
statistically signicant. They become larger and statistically signicant by 1882 and remain so
until 1908. This evidence therefore also suggests that there was more rapid industrialization
in areas that underwent more signicant reforms because of French occupation and invasion.
6 Conclusion
The French Revolution of 1789 had a momentous impact on France and its neighboring coun-
tries. The Revolution violently toppled the established regime and started a complex process,
involving both the infamous French Terror and also radical institutional changes, including the
abolition of the remnants of feudalism in agriculture, the reduction of the power of the nobility
and the clergy, the abolition of guilds and internal taris, and the declaration of equality before
the law for all citizens.
More importantly for the focus of this paper, the French Revolutionary armies, and later
31Napoleon, invaded and controlled Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, parts of Ger-
many. In all of these places, the Revolution undertook essentially the same radical political,
legal, and economic reforms as in France. However, invasion by the French Revolutionary
armies (and later by Napoleon) also came with chaos and the exploitation of the occupied
territories.
Despite the very large literature on the causes and consequences of the French Revolution,
there has been little investigation into the long-run implications of the institutional changes
brought about by the French Revolution. This paper is an attempt in this direction and it
investigates the implications of the radical institutional reforms imposed by the French armies
on neighboring countries as a quasi-natural experiment.
The evidence suggests that areas that underwent the institutional reforms of the French
Revolution experienced more rapid urbanization, especially after 1850. This pattern is fairly
robust when we look at cross-country data on urbanization and if anything stronger when we
focus on within-Germany variation. Even though it is much less satisfactory for examining
these issues, when we use Maddison's data on GDP the overall pattern is similar, though the
results are somewhat weaker.
These ndings are interesting not only as a historical appraisal of the economic impacts of
the Revolution but more importantly because of their implications for the role of institutions
in economic development and for the debate about sources of institutional change. The his-
torical experience we have studied is a clear example of a large-scale and radical institutional
change. In this light, our ndings support recent empirical work emphasizing the centrality of
institutional dierences for comparative economic development. More importantly, the results
are inconsistent with inuential theses in social sciences emphasizing the potential negative
eects of the French Revolution because it imposed potentially `inappropriate,' `designed' and
`French' institutions in a `Big Bang' style|all of these often argued to be inimical to economic
progress. On the contrary, the evidence supports our hypothesis that the institutions of the
ancien r egime impeded prosperity, and that the radical institutional reforms removed these
barriers and paved the way for industrialization and economic growth. Naturally, all of these
ndings have to be interpreted with caution, both because our analysis was limited to the avail-
able historical data and results from one historical episode cannot always be extrapolated to
other eras. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that our ndings do suggest that radical institutional
reforms can have long-run benecial consequences, at least in certain historical contexts.
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37Appendix A: Data description
Variable Description | Source
Invaded by French
Revolutionary Armies
Control by French troops or French-appointed rulers during
the Revolutionary period. | Grab (2003).
Invaded by Napoleonic
Armies
Control by French troops or French-appointed rulers during
the Napoleonic period. | Grab (2003).
Latitude Latitude in degrees of a country's capital. | passim.
Log GDP per capita Log real GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. |
Maddison (2003)
Protestantism \1" if the broad majority of a country belongs to a Protes-
tant denomination, \0" if Catholic, \0.5" if no denomination
predominant. | passim.
Railways Length of the railways network in km. | \Statistische
Nachrichten von den preussischen Eisenbahnen" (until 1880)
and \Statistik der im Betriebe bendlichen Eisenbahnen
Deutschlands" (after 1880)
Sectoral shares Share of the population employed in a given sector | Frank
(1994)
Urbanization Percent of total population living in cities above 5000 inhab-
itants. | See Appendices 6-6.
Years of French Pres-
ence
Years of presence of French troops or rule by French-
appointed rulers. | Grab (2003).
38Appendix B: Coding Urbanization in German Polities
In this paper, we use urbanization rates (dened as the ratio of population living in cities
above 5,000 inhabitants over total population) for a selection of eight pre-unitary German
polities: Hanover, the Rhine province of Prussia, the Westphalian province of Prussia, the rest
of Prussia, excluding the far Eastern provinces of East and West Prussia,34 Saxony, Baden,
W urttemberg, and Bavaria.
The denition of these regions follows post-1815 borders. So, for example, Saxony comprises
only the part left after its substantial territorial losses in the Congress of Vienna, Hanover
comprises East Frisia, Hildesheim, etc., and Bavaria comprises Franconia (but not the Bavarian
Palatinate and the territories later lost to Austria, the Hausruckviertel and the Innviertel).
For the period before 1800, we have resorted to available evidence on population growth rates
in territorial units that roughly corresponded to these post-1815 states, and we have used these
rates to project total population numbers back from 1800. In two cases, Hanover and Bavaria,
the available evidence on population growth rates from 1700 to 1750 was too weak as to allow
us to construct an estimate of total population in 1700. Further details on the construction of
the series are available on request.
The total number of people living in cities above 5,000 inhabitants has been computed from
the Bairoch, Batou, Ch evre (1988) dataset.
Sources
Bairoch, Paul, Batou, Jean and Ch evre, Pierre (1988) La population des villes
europ eennes, 800-1850: banque de donn ees et analyse sommaire des r esultats, Geneva; Droz.
Behre, Otto (1905) Geschichte der Statistik in Brandenburg-Preussen bis zur Gr undung
des K oniglichen Statistischen Bureaus, Berlin; C. Heymanns.
Blaschke, Karlheinz (1967) Bev olkerungsgeschichte von Sachsen bis zur industriellen
Revolution, Weimar; B ohlau.
Boelcke, Willi A. (1987) Wirtschaftsgeschichte Baden-W urttembergs: von den R omern
bis heute, Stuttgart; K. Theiss.
Conrad, Johannes (1918) Grundriss zum Studium der politischen Oekonomie, vol 4.1.
Jena; G. Fischer.
34East and West Prussia were not part of the Holy Roman Empire before, nor of the German Confederation
later
39Dahm, Helmut (1951) \Verluste der J ulisch-Bergischen Landmiliz im Dreiigj ahrigen
Krieg." D usseldorfer Jahrbuch, vol. 45. D usseldorf: D usseldorfer Geschichtsverein.
Hohorst, Gerd (1978) Wirtschaftswachstum und Bev olkerungsentwicklung in Preuen
1816 bis 1914. Dissertation: Westf alische Wilhelms-Universit at zu M unster. Available on
http://www.histat.gesis.org/
Keyser, Erich (1941) Bev olkerungsgeschichte Deutschlands, 2nd ed. Leipzig; S. Hirzel.
Kaufhold, Karl H. and Denzel, Markus (eds., 1988) Historische Statistik des Kurf ursten-
tums/K onigreichs Hannover, St. Katharinen; Scripta Mercaturae.
K onigliches statistisches Landesamt (various years) Beitr age zur Statistik des K onigreichs
Bayern, M unchen.
Lahmeyer, Jan (n.d.) Population statistics: historical demography of all countries, their
divisions and towns. http://www.populstat.info/
Lee, W. Robert (1977) Population growth, economic development, and social change in
Bavaria, New York; Arno Press.
Mitchell, Brian R. (1988) International historical statistics: Europe, 1750-1993, 4th ed.
London; Macmillan.
Sundb arg, Gustav (1905) Aper cus statistiques internationaux, Paris.
Appendix C: Coding Urbanization in Italian Polities
Equivalently to the case of Germany, we constructed total population gures for 13 pre-unitary
Italian polities: Piedmont (including Liguria, but not Sardinia), Lombardy, Venetia, Emilian
states (including Parma and Modena), the Papal Legations (what is now part of Emilia-
Romagna), Tuscany, the Marche, the Papal State excluding the Papal Legations and the
Marche, Naples excluding Sicily, Sicily, and Sardinia. In some cases the denition is grounded
in the fact that these were sovereign states (e.g., Tuscany), in other cases we had to break up
states according to the length of French occupation (e.g., we divided the Papal State into three
parts); in the case of the Emilian states, we chose to aggregate two small states that shared
an analogous experience of French rule.
For some periods, we had to adjust our estimates taking into account border changes that
occurred between the 18th and the 19th century, for example in the case of the Lomellina
(changing hands between Lombardy and Piedmont), or the duchy of Lucca (from Modena to
Tuscany).
40Urbanization rates were constructed by dividing the total urban population as from Bairoch,
Batou, Ch evre (1988) with the total population gures.
Sources
Bairoch, Paul, Batou, Jean and Ch evre, Pierre (1988) La population des villes
europ eennes, 800-1850: banque de donn ees et analyse sommaire des r esultats, Geneva; Droz.
Bandettini, Pierfrancesco (1960) L'evoluzione demograca della Toscana dal 1810 al
1889, Torino; Industria libraria tipograca editrice.
Bandettini, Pierfrancesco (1961) La popolazione della Toscana dal 1810 al 1959,
Firenze; Camera di commercio, industria e agricoltura, Scuola di statistica della universit.
Beltrami, Daniele (1954) Storia della popolazione di Venezia dalla ne del secolo XVI
alla caduta della Repubblica, Padova; CEDAM.
Beloch, Julius (1937-1961) Bev olkerungsgeschichte Italiens, Berlin; de Gruyter.
Breschi, Marco (1990) La popolazione della Toscana dal 1640 al 1940: un'ipotesi di
ricostruzione, Firenze; Dipartimento statistico-matematico, Universit a degli studi di Firenze.
Cipolla, Carlo M. (1965) \Four Centuries of Italian Demographic Development." Ch.
24 in: Glass, David V. and Eversley, D.E.C., Population in History: Essays in Historical
Demography. London; E. Arnold.
Corridore, Francesco (1906) La popolazione dello Stato romano (1656-1901), Roma:
E. Loescher.
Gothaischer Hofkalender: genealogisches Taschenbuch der f urstlichen H auser (various years),
Gotha; J. Perthes.
Felloni, Giuseppe (1961) Popolazione e sviluppo economico della Liguria nel secolo XIX,
Torino; Industria libraria tipograca editrice.
Melano, Giuseppe (1961) La popolazione di Torino e del Piemonte nel secolo XIX,
Torino; Museo Nazionale del Risorgimento.
Mitchell, Brian R. (1998) International historical statistics: Europe, 1750-1993, 4th ed.
London; Macmillan.
Romani, Mario (1950) Un secolo di vita economica Lombarda: 1748-1848, n.p.
41Appendix D: Coding Urbanization after 1850
For urbanization rates in 1900 we resorted, where possible, to ocial census data detailing the
size of the population living in urban centers above 5000 inhabitants. These were available
for the following countries: Germany (including data referring to pre-unitary territorial units),
Italy (including data referring to pre-unitary territorial units), Italy, France, Belgium, England
and Wales.
For the remaining countries the urbanization rate was computed by adding up the total
population residing in cities above 5000 inhabitants from Lahmeyer (populstat.info), and di-
viding this gure by the total population of a country in its present-day borders. The latter
is obtained either from McEvedy and Jones (1978), Lahmeyer (populstat.info) or Maddison
(2003).
Additionally, in the case of German pre-unitarian territories, we could construct exact
urbanization measures using ocial census data for the years 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895,
1900, 1905, 1910. The corresponding data can be retrieved in the various volumes of the
Statistik des deutschen Reichs.
Sources
Census oce (1904) Census of England and Wales. (63 Vict. c. 4.) 1901. General
report with appendices, London; Darling & Son.
Direzione generale della statistica (1902-1904) Censimento della popolazione del
regno d'Italia al 10 febbraio 1901, vol. 5. Roma; Tipograa nazionale di G. Berte.
Lahmeyer, Jan (n.d.) Population statistics: historical demography of all countries, their
divisions and towns, http://www.populstat.info/
Maddison, Angus (2003) The world economy: historical statistics, Paris; Development
Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
McEvedy, Colin and Jones, Richard (1978) Atlas of world population history, Har-
mondsworth and New York; Penguin.
Minist ere de l'int erieur et de l'instruction publique (1903) Statistique de la Bel-
gique. Population. Recensement g en eral du 31 d ecembre 1900, Bruxelles; A. Lesigne.
Statistique G en erale (1904) R esultats statistiques du recensement g en eral de la popu-
lation eectu e le 24 mars 1901, Paris; Imprimerie nationale.
Statistisches Reichsamt (various years) Statistik des deutschen Reichs, Berlin.
42Appendix E: Coding Institutional Reform in German Polities
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the introduction of reforms in 19th century Ger-
many; a list of sources is given below. A more detailed description of this process in all German
pre-unitary states can be found in Acemoglu et. al. (2009).
The introduction of the French civil and commercial codes was one of the reforms most
systematically pursued in the occupied territories of Germany and the civil code, introduced by
Napoleon, was in force until 1900 in the territories left of the Rhine. The codes were enacted
in the Rhineland starting in 1805, in Westphalia starting in 1808, in the Grand Duchy of Berg
starting in 1810, and starting in 1809/1810 for the territories of northern Germany correspond-
ing to present-day Lower Saxony, as well as in the Hanseatic Cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and
L ubeck. At the same time, Baden, under the leadership of its liberal prime minister Johann
Niklas Friedrich Brauer, introduced the Badisches Landrecht, essentially the Code Napol eon
with some minor additions; Bavaria, on the other hand, merely revised some parts of its Codex
Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis of 1756, which however remained a subsidiary legal source,
second to customary law.
After the demise of Napoleonic rule in Germany, the territories east of the Rhine were quick
in reintroducing the previous legal systems and dismantling all remnants of the Napoleonic
reforms. Two exceptions stand out, though. The lands that were taken over by Prussia ob-
tained the Allgemeines Landrecht (ALR), the ambitious Prussian civil code of 1794, a 19,000
paragraphs-long codication of all legal matters which, while retaining some vestiges of the
feudal system, was a progressive work for its times, heavily inuenced by the ideals of the En-
lightenment. The other exception is represented by the Rhineland, where the local bourgeoisie
successfully defended the presence of the Code Napol eon, evidently favorable to their position.
The abolition of guilds is another reform intimately linked to the abolition of the rem-
nants of the ancien r egime. The development mirrors the case of the introduction of the civil
code: guilds are rst abolished in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine (1800), then
in the Napoleonic states of Westphalia (1808) and Berg (1809), nally in Northern Germany.
Restoration of the status quo ante occurred equally quickly in the reactionary states of Han-
nover and Hesse-Kassel between 1814 and 1816. Even the Hanseatic cities reversed the reforms
they had been subjected to.
The situation in the Prussian territories was varied: while the Gewerbefreiheit (freedom of
commerce, including the abolition of guilds) was a pillar of the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg,
43it extended at rst only to the core territories of Prussia at its minimal territorial extension
after the Peace of Tilsit. Following the Congress of Vienna, the abolition of guilds was sustained
in the Rhineland (both Prussian and non-Prussian) and in the former territories of Berg and
Westphalia.
The policies of no other German state were as consistent with freedom of commerce af-
ter 1815 as were those of Prussia; Baden retained its guild structure, whereas W urttemberg
reorganized its guilds in larger units, allowing for a small degree of mobility within groups.
Bavaria and Saxony moved instead to a concession-based system, where a state bureaucracy
would determine the number of people and the prerequisites to become craftsmen. A tempo-
rary backlash occurred during and after the 1848 revolution, when there was pressure for a
restoration of guild structures in many states that had so far pursued liberal policies, and full
liberalization all over Germany was eventually achieved with the new Gewerbeordnung (law
regulating commerce) after unication in 1871.
Agrarian reforms are another dimension along which dierent approaches are discernible
across German states, even when restricting one's view only to the territories west of the Elbe,
where the feudal relations were less oppressive than in the eastern territories characterized by
serfdom and the Gutsherrschaft form of land tenure. Again, we can see that the wave of reforms
was lead by the French occupiers rst, and by the Prussian `defensive modernizers' thereafter.
The most radical attempt to reform succeeded only west of the Rhine, where serfdom was
abolished without compensation and duties were made redeemable for 15 times their annual
value in 1798.
Reforms followed suit in Berg (1808) and Westphalia (1809), but confusion soon arose about
the exact terms of the redemption of feudal payments. All reforms were ultimately blocked
by decree in 1812, and resumed only in Prussian times. In fact, at the same time Prussia was
already implementing agrarian reforms in parts of Prussia, starting with the edict of October
9th, 1807, which in 1821 was perfected with laws regulating the exact terms of redemption of
feudal duties (25 times their annual value).
A law describing the exact amount needed to exit the feudal relation of the Grundherrschaft
was a crucial precondition for agrarian reforms that did not remain a dead letter. Hence what
the gures in column 5 of Table 2 report is the introduction of such laws, as well as the abolition
of serfdom (a mere formality in most territories west of the Elbe).
The emancipation of Jews is the one reform that was pursued less consistently across
44Germany. The initial steps taken in the Napoleonic states|the most liberal policy was enacted
in Westphalia|were rapidly circumscribed with the d ecret inf^ ame of 1808, which limited
the occupational choice of Jews in the Rhineland through concession-based system. In a
similar fashion, Prussia granted wide-ranging freedoms at rst through the law of March 1812,
but retreated soon afterwards, when it failed to extend the freedoms to the newly acquired
territories. While full emancipation of the Jews, including political rights, had to wait until
unication in 1871, some states granted wide-ranging freedoms to their Jewish subjects, in
particular with respect to occupational choices. Baden, Brunswick, Anhalt, and the free city
of Frankfurt, where the Rothschild dynasty originated, were examples in point.
Sources
Coing, Helmut (1973) Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europ aischen
Privatrechtsgeschichte, vol. III.3, M unchen; C.H. Beck.
Dipper, Christoph (1980) Die Bauernbefreiung in Deutschland, Stuttgart; Kohlham-
mer.
Georges, Dirk (1993) 1810/11-1993: Handwerk und Interessenpolitik, Frankfurt am
Main; P. Lang.
L utge, Friedrich (1957) Die mitteldeutsche Grundherrschaft und ihre Au osung, 2nd
ed., Stuttgart; G. Fischer.
L utge, Friedrich (1963) Geschichte der deutschen Agrarverfassung vom fr uhen Mittelal-
ter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart; E. Ulmer.
Mascher, H. (1866) Das deutsche Gewerbewesen von der fr uhesten Zeit bis auf die Gegen-
wart, Potsdam; E. D oring.
Meyer, Michael A. (ed., 1996) Deutsch-j udische Geschichte in der Neuzeit, vol. 2,
M unchen; C.H. Beck.
R onne, Ludwig von and Heinrich Simon (1843) Die fr uheren und gegenw artigen
Verh altnisse der Juden in den saemmtlichen Landestheilen des Preuischen Staates, Breslau;
G.Ph. Aderholz.
Schmoller, Gustav (1870) Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingewerbe, Halle; Verlag
der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses.
Schr oder, Richard (1905) Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 5th ed., Leipzig;
Veit & Comp.
45Schubert, Werner (1977a) Franz osisches Recht in Deutschland zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhun-
derts, K oln; B ohlau.
Schubert, Werner (1977b) \Das franz osische Recht in Deutschland zu Beginn der
Restaurationszeit (1814-1820)," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung f ur Rechtsgeschichte, German-
istische Abteilung, 107, 129-184.
Toury, Jacob (1976) Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847-
1871: Zwischen Revolution, Reaktion und Emanzipation, D usseldorf; Droste.
Wernet, Karl Friedrich (1963) \Handwerksgeschichtliche Perspektiven," Forschungs-
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Austria 0 0 0
Belgium 20 1 1 1794 1814
Britain 0 0 0
Czech Republic and Slovakia 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 0
Netherlands 18 1 1 1795 1813
Norway 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0
Spain 4 0 1 1809 1813
Sweden 0 0 0
Switzerland 5 1 1 1798 1803
Germany
Baden 0 0 0
Bavaria 0 0 0
Hanover 3 0 1 1810 1813
Prussia, East of Napoleon 0 0 0
Prussia, Rhineland 19 1 1 1795 1814
Prussia, Westphalia 6 0 1 1807 1813
Saxony 0 0 0
Württemberg 0 0 0
Italy
Emilian States 15 1 1 1801 1814 republic 1797-99
Liguria 17 1 1 1797 1814 republic 1797-99
Lombardy 15 1 1 1801 1814
Marche 6 0 1 1808 1814
Naples 9 0 1 1806 1815 republic for 5 months
Papal Legations 14 1 1 1802 1814 republic 1797-99
Papal States, Umbria and Lazio 6 0 1 1809 1814 republic 1798-99
Piedmont 13 0 1 1802 1814 occupied 1798-99
Sardinia 0 0 0
Sicily 0 0 0
Tuscany 6 0 1 1808 1814
Veneto 8 0 1 1806 1814
Eastern Europe
Albania 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0
Former Yugoslavia 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0
Hungary 0 0 0
Poland 6 0 1 1807 1813
Romania 0 0 0
Russia 0 0 0
Countries in the dataset
Table 1

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (8)
Hanover 0 1 3 1900 1831 1869 1848 4.75 25
Prussia (Eastern part) 0 0 0 1794 1821 1810 1869 31.25 68.75
Prussia, Rhine Province 1 1 19 1805 1811 1800 1869 33.5 71
Prussia, Westphalia 0 1 6 1808 1825 1808 1869 27.25 64.75
Saxony 0 0 0 1863 1832 1862 1849 4.5 35.75
Baden 0 0 0 1810 1785 1862 1862 26.25 60.75
Württemberg 0 0 0 1900 1836 1862 1864 3.5 25.5
Bavaria 0 0 0 1900 1826 1868 1868 6 26.5
1805 1811 1800 1869 33.5 71
1854 1822 1849 1861 14.79 43.86
1838 1822 1826 1862 21.83 53.58
1853 1820 1853 1862 14.3 43.45




Notes: Sources for the dates of reform are listed in Appendix B. Averages in the lower panel of this table are unweighted. The reform index in columns (8) and (9) has 
been computed exemplarily for two dates (1850, 1900) according to the formula reported in the text.
Invaded by French revolutionary armies, average:
Not invaded by French revolutionary armies, average:
Invaded by Napoleonic armies, average:
Not invaded by Napoleonic armies, average:













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Urbanization dataset
Urbanization in 1700 11.819 18.703 10.042 15.278 9.146
(11.798) (9.9) (11.728) (9.325) (12.980)
Urbanization in 1750 12.312 17.475 11.060 14.823 10.347
(10.958) (7.624) (11.363) (8.085) (12.595)
Urbanization in 1800 15.256 18.642 14.435 17.799 13.266
(11.749) (8.727) (12.342) (8.978) (13.389)
Urbanization in 1850 16.295 20.484 15.279 18.178 14.821
(11.46) (7.126) (12.149) (7.638) (13.73)
Urbanization in 1900 41.183 55.936 37.495 51.328 32.882
(21.241) (15.458) (21.058) (18.235) (20.207)
Invaded by French Rev. Armies 0.195 1 0 0.444 0
(0.397) (0) (0) (0.5) (0)
Invaded by Napoleonic Armies 0.439 1 0.333 1 0
(0.497) (0) (0.473) (0) (0)
Years of French Presence 4.634 15.375 2.030 10.556 0
(6.424) (4.442) (3.417) (5.601) (0)
Latitude 47.797 47.460 47.879 46.513 48.802
(6.022) (3.067) (6.545) (4.015) (7.07)
Protestant 0.268 0.125 0.303 0.139 0.370
(0.416) (0.219) 0.444 (0.281) (0.473)
Observations (panel) 205 40 165 90 115
Panel B: GDP per capita dataset
Log GDP per capita in 1700 6.701 7.063 6.595 6.924 6.597
(0.339) (0.354) (0.259) (0.386) (0.269)
Log GDP per capita in 1820 6.844 7.139 6.758 7.02 6.763
(0.326) (0.226) (0.302) (0.297) (0.315)
Log GDP per capita in 1850 7.079 7.414 6.974 7.26 6.988
(0.351) (0.232) (0.318) (0.33) (0.336)
Log GDP per capita in 1900 7.601 8.021 7.477 7.837 7.49
(0.418) (0.314) (0.365) (0.409) (0.386)
Invaded by French Rev. Armies 0.227 1 0 0.714 0
(0.420) (0) (0) (0.456) (0)
Invaded by Napoleonic Armies 0.318 1 0.118 1 0
(0.467) (0) (0.323) (0) (0)
Year of French Presence 2.955 11 0.588 9.286 0
(5.653) (6.928) (1.653) (6.466) (0)
Latitude 48.957 48.433 49.110 47.826 49.484
(6.914) (3.762) (7.601) (4.596) (7.724)
Protestant 0.273 0.200 0.294 0.143 0.333
(0.420) (0.248) (0.457) (0.228) (0.473)
Observations (panel) 176 40 136 56 120
Table 3A
Descriptive Statistics: Europe
Notes: Mean values. Standard deviations in parentheses. The number of observations refers to the total 
observations in the panel, not to a single cross-section. For the summary statistics of log GDP per capita, only a 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
German urbanization dataset
Urbanization in 1700 5.639 9.061 4.955 5.521 5.698
(3.14) . (2.968) (5.007) (2.839)
Urbanization in 1750 7.414 10.437 6.982 5.791 8.387
(4.319) . (4.475) (4.152) (4.568)
Urbanization in 1800 9.810 14.883 9.086 10.099 9.637
(3.547) . (3.126) (4.278) (3.572)
Urbanization in 1850 12.514 21.594 11.217 12.700 12.402
(5.254) . (4.062) (7.717) (4.299)
Urbanization in 1900 42.382 60.872 39.741 48.409 38.766
(14.084) . (12.896) (15.380) (13.612)
Invaded by French Rev. Armies 0.125 1 0 0.33 0
(0.332) . (0) (0.478) (0)
Invaded by Napoleonic Armies 0.5 1 0.429 1 0
(0.503) . (0.498) (0) (0)
Years of French Presence 3.5 19 1.286 9.333 0
(6.237) . (2.198) (7.043) (0)
Observations (panel) 96 12 84 36 60
Table 3B
Descriptive Statistics: Germany
Notes: Mean values. Standard deviations in parentheses. The number of observations refers to the total 
observations in the panel, not to a single cross-section. For the summary statistics of urbanization, only a 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
French Revolution -0.161 -2.625 -1.026 -0.235
  x 1750 year dummy [0.091] [1.292] [2.121] [0.090]
French Revolution -0.189 -4.832 -0.969 -0.200
  x 1800 year dummy [0.116] [1.520] [2.179] [0.169]
French Revolution -0.236 -3.835 -2.145 -0.289
 x 1850 year dummy [0.154] [2.385] [2.218] [0.207]
French Revolution 0.899 9.521 13.081 0.662
 x 1900 year dummy [0.382] [6.154] [5.162] [0.513]
p-value for joint significance 0.001 0.037 0.006 0.000
"French Revolution" after 1800












Observations 202 202 202 202
Countries 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.85
Table 4
Country Level Impact of French Revolution: Urbanization
Dependent variable: Urbanization (Percent living in cities above 5000 inh.)
Notes: Country level data (pre-unitarian polities for Italy and Germany); all regressions 
have full set of country and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country/polity. Base sample is all West and East European countries (except France). Data 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
French Revolution -0.161 -0.158 -0.161 -0.136 -0.129
  x 1750 year dummy [0.091] [0.096] [0.091] [0.105] [0.104]
French Revolution -0.189 -0.203 -0.197 -0.194 -0.153
  x 1800 year dummy [0.116] [0.115] [0.120] [0.115] [0.120]
French Revolution -0.236 -0.234 -0.214 -0.192 -0.143
 x 1850 year dummy [0.154] [0.155] [0.163] [0.153] [0.161]
French Revolution 0.899 0.914 0.847 1.137 1.169
 x 1900 year dummy [0.382] [0.394] [0.396] [0.422] [0.400]
p-value for joint significance 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
"French Revolution" after 1800
p-value for joint significance of  0.064 0.332
"latitude" interactions
p-value for joint significance of  0.359 0.563
"initial urbanization" interactions
p-value for joint significance of  0.055 0.114
"protestantism" interactions















Observations 202 202 202 202 202
Countries 41 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89
Table 5
Country Level Impact of French Revolution: Urbanization
Dependent variable: Urbanization (Percent living in cities above 5000 inh.)
Notes: Country level data (pre-unitarian polities for Italy and Germany); all regressions have full set of 
country and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered by country/polity. Base sample is all West 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (7)
French Revolution -0.161 -0.152 -0.192 -0.345
  x 1750 year dummy [0.091] [0.092] [0.089] [0.091]
French Revolution -0.189 -0.159 -0.133 -0.353 0.838 0.53 0.532 0.522
  x 1800 year dummy [0.116] [0.113] [0.118] [0.140] [0.69] [0.49] [0.73] [0.42]
French Revolution -0.236 -0.179 -0.157 -0.31 -0.100 -0.302 0.125 0.141
 x 1850 year dummy [0.154] [0.144] [0.148] [0.094] [0.43] [0.32] [0.61] [0.22]
French Revolution 0.899 1.001 0.742 0.283 1.057 0.878 1.014 0.705
 x 1900 year dummy [0.382] [0.374] [0.383] [0.227] [0.38] [0.33] [0.68] [0.33]
Lagged dependent variable 0.511 0.126 0.787 0.629
[1.00] [0.69] [1.17] [0.72]
p-value for joint significance 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.013
"French Revolution" after 1800
























Excluding the UK N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Excluding Eastern Europe N N Y N N N Y N
Excluding Italy and Germany N N N Y N N N Y
Observations 202 197 152 99 120 117 90 59
Countries 41 40 31 20 41 40 31 20
R-squared 0.87 0.88 0.9 0.85
Notes: Country level data (pre-unitarian polities for Italy and Germany); all regressions have full set of country and year dummies. Robust standard 
errors, clustered by country/polity. Base sample is all West and East European countries (except France). Data sources: see Appendix.
Country Level Impact of French Revolution: Urbanization
Dependent variable: Urbanization (Percent living in cities above 5000 inh.)














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
French Revolution 0.122 0.203 0.09 0.095 0.131 0.122 0.135
  x 1700 year dummy [0.102] [0.146] [0.108] [0.099] [0.103] [0.112] [0.105]
French Revolution 0.042 0.106 0.022 0.008 0.057 0.031 0.028
  x 1820 year dummy [0.049] [0.066] [0.065] [0.062] [0.048] [0.051] [0.050]
French Revolution 0.088 0.204 0.054 0.05 0.108 0.097 0.074
 x 1850 year dummy [0.043] [0.056] [0.095] [0.064] [0.038] [0.045] [0.078]
French Revolution 0.164 0.371 0.139 0.118 0.191 0.169 0.134
 x 1870 year dummy [0.042] [0.064] [0.140] [0.073] [0.031] [0.038] [0.087]
French Revolution 0.152 0.392 0.169 0.093 0.179 0.164 0.136
 x 1890 year dummy [0.047] [0.106] [0.147] [0.084] [0.039] [0.048] [0.109]
French Revolution 0.116 0.359 0.141 0.054 0.141 0.114 0.1
 x 1900 year dummy [0.054] [0.142] [0.156] [0.090] [0.049] [0.058] [0.121]
p-value for joint significance of  0.000 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028
post-1820 treatment interactions





















Excluding Italy and Germany Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Excluding the UK N N N N Y Y N
Excluding Eastern Europe N N N N N Y N
Including latitude, protestant, initial GDP N N N N N N Y
Observations 158 158 158 174 150 96 158
Countries 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.97
R-squared 20 20 20 22 19 12 20
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita
Country Level Impact of French Revolution: GDP per capita
Table 7
Notes: Country level data (pre-unitarian states for Italy and Germany); all regressions have full set of country and year dummies. Robust 
standard errors, clustered by country. "Years of French Presence" is measured in decades (years/10). Controls (latitude, protestant, initial GDP 
in 1500) are included as a full set of interactions with time dummies. Base sample is all West and East European countries (except France). Data 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
French Revolution -0.192 -3.115 1.77 -0.167 0.0937 -0.15 -0.187 -0.291
  x 1750 year dummy [0.14] [2.21] [5.65] [0.17] [0.23] [0.084] [0.12] [0.15]
French Revolution 0.008 -0.773 4.826 0.02 0.46 (0.01) 0.01 -0.113 0.195
  x 1800 year dummy [0.15] [2.37] [4.69] [0.18] [0.34] [0.15] [0.14] [0.18] [0.18]
French Revolution 0.187 3.807 4.664 0.21 0.71 0.17 0.15 0.072 0.333
 x 1850 year dummy [0.15] [2.26] [4.60] [0.18] [0.34] [0.17] [0.13] [0.18] [0.14]
French Revolution 0.712 12.52 9.745 0.774 1.32 0.67 0.672 0.621
 x 1875 year dummy [0.20] [3.06] [4.83] [0.25] [0.38] [0.18] [0.14] [0.14]
French Revolution 0.765 13.17 10.47 0.836 1.39 0.718 0.724 0.665
 x 1880 year dummy [0.23] [3.52] [5.15] [0.29] [0.38] [0.18] [0.18] [0.16]
French Revolution 0.81 13.23 11.33 0.901 1.451 0.757 0.769 0.693
 x 1885 year dummy [0.26] [3.90] [4.99] [0.31] [0.40] [0.16] [0.23] [0.19]
French Revolution 0.85 13.44 11.83 0.95 1.508 0.792 0.808 0.725
 x 1890 year dummy [0.29] [4.38] [5.33] [0.35] [0.41] [0.16] [0.27] [0.22]
French Revolution 0.864 13.13 12.42 0.99 1.538 0.8 0.821 0.717
 x 1895 year dummy [0.33] [4.77] [5.65] [0.38] [0.43] [0.15] [0.31] [0.27]
French Revolution 0.988 14.56 14.01 1.044 1.678 0.919 0.945 0.905 1.098
 x 1900 year dummy [0.37] [5.41] [6.45] [0.46] [0.44] [0.24] [0.38] [0.25] [0.59]
French Revolution 1.063 15.22 15.04 1.165 1.769 0.988 1.019 0.925
 x 1905 year dummy [0.36] [5.29] [6.24] [0.42] [0.47] [0.17] [0.39] [0.28]
French Revolution 1.075 14.92 15.72 1.168 1.798 0.994 1.03 0.952
 x 1910 year dummy [0.37] [5.39] [6.23] [0.43] [0.50] [0.19] [0.42] [0.29]
ControlXtime trend 88.96 32.23 2.166
[75.2] [11.1] [7.21]
ControlXtime trendXpost-1800 -1.321 -0.892 0.246
[2.21] [0.50] [0.21]
Lagged dependent variable 0.201
[1.42]
p-value for joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059
"French Revolution" after 1800
































Observations 94 94 94 82 94 94 94 94 22
Countries 8 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 8
R-squared 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96
Within-Germany Impact of French Revolution: Urbanization in 8 regions
Dependent variable: Urbanization (Percent living in cities above 5000 inh.)
Notes: Urbanization data for 8 pre-unitary German territories; all regressions have full set of country and year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
territory. 






west of Elbe, 
overid Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Weighted 
Fixed Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: OLS estimation
Reforms Index 0.368 0.419 0.368 0.419 0.376 0.295 0.345 0.376
[0.13] [0.15] [0.13] [0.15] [0.13] [0.17] [0.14] [0.11]
ControlXtime trend -22.79 28.84 2.704
[53.9] [16.1] [7.03]
ControlXtime trendXpost-1800 2.273 -1.109 0.166
[2.56] [0.59] [0.34]
Panel B: First stage
Years of French Presence 0.711 0.878 0.698 0.658 0.7 0.603
  x post-1800 dummy x time trend [0.25] [0.24] [0.46] [0.21] [0.27] [0.32]
ControlXtime trend -22.57 19.96 0.33
[61.4] [15.4] [3.30]
ControlXtime trendXpost-1800 1.355 0.564 0.175
[6.62] [1.58] [0.65]
Panel C: 2SLS estimation
Reforms Index 0.658 0.575 0.693 0.608 0.916 0.659 0.636 0.741
[0.21] [0.17] [0.21] [0.18] [0.50] [0.23] [0.21] [0.24]
ControlXtime trend 15.23 22.07 2.678
[60.5] [15.8] [6.04]
ControlXtime trendXpost-1800 3.471 -1.464 0.0823
[6.68] [0.91] [0.50]
p-value overidentification test 0.529 0.428
Control




Number of Countries 8 7 8 7 8 8 8 8
Number of Observations 94 82 94 82 94 94 94 94
Table 9
Within-Germany Impact of French Revolution: Urbanization in 8 regions
Dependent variable: Urbanization (Percent living in cities above 5000 inh.)
Notes: Urbanization data for 8 pre-unitary German territories; all regressions have full set of country and year dummies. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by territory. The overidentification test in columns 3 and 4 uses robust standard errors.Dependent variable:
baseline               west of Elbe baseline               west of Elbe baseline               west of Elbe baseline               west of Elbe
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cross-sections, impact of the French Revolution
in 1859 -0.015 -0.001 Cross-sections, impact of the French Revolution
[0.014] [0.038]
in 1864 -0.001 0.01 in 1849 -0.388 -0.411 0.331 0.061 0.077 0.076
[0.014] [0.039] [0.332] [0.460] [0.391] [0.342] [0.004] [0.016]
in 1869 0.004 0.026 in 1882 -0.525 -0.486 0.487 0.386 0.045 0.052
[0.017] [0.040] [0.210] [0.244] [0.263] [0.240] [0.023] [0.025]
in 1874 0.000 0.012 in 1895 -0.620 -0.601 0.539 0.449 0.055 0.063
[0.016] [0.030] [0.186] [0.242] [0.237] [0.231] [0.027] [0.031]
in 1880 0.037 0.057 in 1907 -0.672 -0.585 0.474 0.321 0.059 0.070
[0.015] [0.018] [0.233] [0.264] [0.255] [0.251] [0.027] [0.032]
in 1885 0.036 0.056
[0.014] [0.016]
in 1890 0.034 0.056
[0.013] [0.016]
in 1895 0.030 0.051
[0.013] [0.015]
in 1900 0.088 0.134
[0.029] [0.034]
in 1905 0.090 0.136
[0.029] [0.035]
in 1910 0.089 0.135
[0.029] [0.035]
Notes: Each cell corresponds to one cross-sectional regression. Impact of the French Revolution is measured in Years of 
French Control. District level data. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level. Number of observations 
(baseline/west of Elbe): 39/23 (1849), 62/44 (other years).
Agriculture Industry and Manufacturing Commerce
Table 10
Within-Germany Impact of French Revolution: Railways
log(km of railways)
Notes: Each cell corresponds to one cross-sectional regression. 
Impact of the French Revolution is measured in Years of 
French Control. Robust standard errors, clustered by state. 
Data are for Prussia only until 1874, for provinces and states 
only after 1895. Number of observations (baseline/west of 
Elbe): 23/11 (until 1864), 29/14 (until 1874), 73/53 (until 
1895), 38/27 (after 1895). 
Table 11
Within-Germany Impact of French Revolution: Occupational shares
Dependent variable: Share of population employed